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 A DEMOCRATIC THEORY OF AMICUS ADVOCACY 
RUBEN J. GARCIA∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 Amicus curiae (“friend of the court”) participation in litigation has 
flourished in recent years as many groups and individuals seek to in-
fluence the outcome of litigation. Amicus filers are not parties and 
judges have wide discretion to reject amicus briefs if they believe that 
the amicus participation does not add anything to the briefs already 
filed by the parties. In three recent cases, Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals Judge Richard Posner has rejected amicus filings and prom-
ised to closely scrutinize applications to file amicus briefs in the fu-
ture. Judge Posner’s influence has led an increasing number of 
judges, primarily at the district court level, to deny leave to file 
amicus briefs. 
 This Article argues for the importance of amicus participation in a 
democratic system. The Article proposes changes to the federal appel-
late standards for granting leave to file amicus briefs. Currently, 
court rules generally require that amicus briefs add something new to 
the arguments already made by the parties. This Article argues that 
the standards for sanctions under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure should determine whether amicus briefs should be accepted for 
filing. This standard might increase the number of amicus briefs that 
are accepted for filing, but would also increase democratic participa-
tion in the court system. While placing some limits on amicus partici-
pation is important to the proper functioning of the judicial system, 
this Article argues that limits on amicus participation should be 
minimal in light of the democratic and constitutional values that 
amicus participation furthers. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Amicus curiae1 (herein “amicus” or “amici”) briefs have become a 
regular part of the litigation process. Indeed, these briefs filed by 
nonparties to litigation have become so common that some judges are 
looking for ways to limit them. In a 2003 Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals opinion, Judge Richard Posner denied leave to file an amicus 
brief and cited the following reasons: 
[J]udges have heavy caseloads and therefore need to minimize ex-
traneous reading; amicus briefs, often solicited by parties, may be 
used to make an end run around court-imposed limitations on the 
length of parties’ briefs; the time and other resources required for 
the preparation and study of, and response to, amicus briefs drive 
up the cost of litigation; and the filing of an amicus brief is often 
an attempt to inject interest group politics into the federal appeals 
process.2 
As Judge Posner’s exasperated tone indicates, amicus briefs have 
flourished as a part of the litigation process. A recent study of amicus 
activity in the United States Supreme Court found that amicus briefs 
were filed in only 39% of the cases during the Warren Court (1953-
1969) and 67.5% of the cases in the Burger Court (1969-1986).3 By 
                                                                                                                     
 1. According to Black’s Law Dictionary: “[Latin ‘friend of the court’] A person who is 
not a party to a lawsuit but who petitions the court or is requested by the court to file a 
brief in the action because that person has a strong interest in the subject matter. . . . Of-
ten shortened to amicus. . . . Also termed friend of the court. Pl. amici curiae.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 93 (8th ed. 2004). 
 2. Voices for Choices v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542, 544 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing 
Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 223 F.3d 615, 616-17 (7th Cir. 2000) and Ryan v. 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 125 F.3d 1062 (7th Cir. 1997)). 
 3. JUDITHANNE SCOURFIELD MCLAUCHLAN, CONGRESSIONAL PARTICIPATION AS 
AMICUS CURIAE BEFORE THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 28 (2005). 
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contrast, amicus briefs were filed in 83% of U.S. Supreme Court 
cases from 1986 to 1997.4  
 Amicus briefs are filed by persons or groups not directly involved 
in the litigation. All courts impose some limits on whether amicus 
briefs may be filed.5 Despite the historical roots and proliferation of 
amicus participation in recent years, the practice is looked at with 
suspicion by some observers.6 Judge Posner’s influence on the law 
merits a closer examination of why we have amicus participation in 
our democratic system.7 
 This Article offers a normative defense of amicus participation, in 
light of its important role in the legal profession and in a democratic 
judicial system. The amicus brief is a form of speech and petition, to 
which the courts should give due consideration.8 The use of amicus 
briefs to petition the government is especially important for constitu-
tional issues since the judiciary is empowered to interpret the Con-
stitution. The goal of this Article is to guide judicial discretion in fa-
vor of broad acceptance of amicus briefs, rather than the narrow view 
espoused by Judge Posner and other detractors who view amicus 
briefs as nefarious interest group activity. 
 Much of the scholarship on amicus briefs has described how the 
courts make decisions and the impact of amicus participation on 
                                                                                                                     
 4. Id. 
 5. For example, Supreme Court Rule 37 states: “An amicus curiae brief that brings 
to the attention of the Court relevant matter not already brought to its attention by the 
parties may be of considerable help to the Court. An amicus curiae brief that does not 
serve this purpose burdens the Court, and its filing is not favored.” SUP. CT. R. 37(1). 
 6. Andrew Frey, Amici Curiae: Friends of the Court or Nuisances?, 33 LITIG. 5 
(2006), available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article.asp?id=3144&nid=6 
(describing the recent trend of courts in limiting or rejecting amicus briefs); Andrew P. 
Morriss, Private Amici Curiae and the Supreme Court’s 1997-1998 Term Employment Law 
Jurisprudence, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 823 (1999) (expressing concern about the help-
fulness of amici in Supreme Court employment cases); John Harrington, Note, Amici Cu-
riae in the Federal Courts of Appeals: How Friendly Are They?, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
667 (2005) (arguing that most amicus briefs are not helpful to courts and should be lim-
ited).  
 7. Judge Posner is a prolific author of both judicial opinions and legal scholarship in 
a number of areas ranging from law and economics to pragmatism and security policy. His 
most recent books deal with the government’s prosecution of terrorism post-9/11. See 
RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL 
EMERGENCY (2006); RICHARD A. POSNER, UNCERTAIN SHIELD: THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE 
SYSTEM IN THE THROES OF REFORM (2006). For scholarship examining the influence of 
Judge Posner on the law, see, for example, Robert F. Blomquist, Playing on Words: Judge 
Richard A. Posner’s Appellate Opinions, 1981-82–Ruminations on Sexy Judicial Opinion 
Style During an Extraordinary Rookie Season, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 651 (2000); see also Pro-
ject Posner, http://www.projectposner.org (last visited Feb. 15, 2008) (searchable database 
of Judge Posner’s decisions). 
 8. Robert L. Tsai, Conceptualizing Constitutional Litigation as Anti-Government Ex-
pression: A Speech-Centered Theory of Court Access, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 835 (2002). 
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those decisions.9 These articles focused on empirical data document-
ing the rise in amicus participation in courts at all levels over the 
last thirty years.10 Courts have generally allowed amicus briefs to be 
filed, and several studies have tried to measure their effectiveness 
and impact. This Article, building on previous studies revealing that 
amicus briefs have some impact on judicial decisionmaking,11 will fo-
cus on the normative question of how courts ought to decide whether 
to grant leave to file amicus briefs. This Article places the amicus 
brief in historical, constitutional, and institutional contexts to argue 
for a broader standard for courts to accept the filing of amicus briefs. 
Further, this Article argues that judges may have an ethical duty to 
give fair consideration to all amicus briefs filed. 
 This Article also argues that amicus litigation has an expressive 
function that may be protected by the Constitution. Research on the 
efficacy of litigation as a social movement strategy continues to pro-
duce divergent results.12 Some activists argue that engaging in litiga-
tion diverts movement resources away from needed work in other 
arenas, such as legislative or grassroots organizing work.13 Others 
point to the need for litigation to shape the goals of social move-
ments.14 Regardless of the efficacy of the litigation, it is clear that 
many social movements use the courts to send messages about their 
goals. Rather than initiating lawsuits for this purpose, many groups 
are utilizing amicus curiae status to get their messages into the pub-
lic domain. The amicus brief is typically the only court appearance 
allowed by a nonparty to litigation. 
                                                                                                                     
 9. See, e.g., Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 
72 YALE L.J. 694 (1963) (discussing that amicus curiae briefs can, among other things, 
provide factual information to the court and point out implications of the court’s ruling). 
 10. Paul M. Collins Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Cu-
riae Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 807, 810-16 
(2004) (analyzing why amicus briefs are effective); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. 
Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 
743, 751-56 (2000) (exploring amici curiae activity to the Supreme Court in the last fifty 
years).  
11. Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Amici Curiae Before the Supreme Court: 
Who Participates, When, and How Much?, 52 J. POL. 782 (1990); Donald R. Songer & 
Reginald S. Sheehan, Interest Group Success in the Courts: Amicus Participation in the 
Supreme Court, 46 POL. RES. Q. 339 (1993). 
12. See generally MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND 
THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: 
CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991). 
 13. LEE EPSTEIN, CONSERVATIVES IN COURT (1985) (examining the use of amicus cu-
riae briefs by conservative interest groups); Christopher Coleman et al., Social Movements 
and Social-Change Litigation: Synergy in the Montgomery Bus Protest, 30 L. & SOC. 
INQUIRY 663, 666-67 (2005) (critiquing GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN 
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991)). 
 14. Michael K. Lowman, The Litigating Amicus Curiae: When Does the Party Begin 
After the Friends Leave?, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1243, 1258-65 (1992) (arguing for a limit on 
court discretion to allow the amicus curiae device). 
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 The burden on lawyers’ First Amendment rights by court sanc-
tions and bar discipline is frequently justified by lawyers’ role as offi-
cers of the court.15 As officers of the court, attorneys are ethically 
bound not to clog the courts’ docket with frivolous litigation, and also 
to display candor to the tribunal.16 Because amicus briefs are often 
used by organized groups to send a message to legislatures, courts, 
and the public rather than to achieve a particular result, the “officer 
of the court” function is in tension with free speech.17 This Article 
does not argue for an abolition of the limits on the filing of amicus 
briefs. Instead, the standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
(FRCP) 11, usually used to sanction parties, can provide a better 
“gatekeeper” function to decide which briefs should be accepted for 
filing than the current rules on amicus participation.18 
 This Article places the right to file amicus briefs within the First 
Amendment right to petition.19 Although the First Amendment’s Pe-
tition Clause and its language “for the redress of grievances” seems 
to require that the citizenry have something approaching the stand-
ing required by Article III of the Constitution, this is inconsistent 
with common usage of the petition clause in town halls and public 
meetings and congressional hearings.20 
 The amicus brief is an institutional part of U.S. court systems, 
serving to broaden the transparency and democratic legitimacy in 
the courts. I argue in this Article that the courts should give fair con-
sideration to amicus briefs unless they are plainly sanctionable.21 
                                                                                                                     
 15. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Intersection of Free Speech and the Legal Profession: 
Constraints on Lawyers’ First Amendment Rights, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 569, 569-70 (1998).  
 16. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1-3.4 (2003). 
 17. Erwin Chemerinsky, Silence is Not Golden: Protecting Lawyer Speech Under the 
First Amendment, 47 EMORY L.J. 859, 872-74 (1998) (arguing that lower scrutiny of re-
strictions on lawyer speech is an unconstitutional condition on bar membership); W. Brad-
ley Wendel, Free Speech for Lawyers, 28 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 305, 357-59 (2001) (exam-
ining the consistency of lawyers’ diminished speech rights with ethical obligations).  
 18. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
 19. Karen O’Connor & Lee Epstein, Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S. Supreme 
Court Litigation: Appraisal of Hakman’s “Folklore”, 16 LAW & SOC. REV. No. 2, 311 (1981) 
(testing Hakman’s 1956 argument that amicus parties are not engaging in interest group 
activity); Karen O’Connor & Lee Epstein, Court Rules and Workload: A Case Study of 
Rules Governing Amicus Curiae Participation, 8 JUST. SYS. J. 35 (1983) (finding that the 
Supreme Court rarely rejects amicus briefs, but the influence of amici on Court decisions is 
variable).  
 20. Michael J. Harris, Note, Amicus Curiae: Friend or Foe? The Limits of Friendship 
in American Jurisprudence, 5 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 1 (2000) (expressing con-
cern about “litigating amici”).  
 21. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) requires attorneys and parties submitting to the court to cer-
tify “to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry 
reasonable under the circumstances” that: 
(1) [the paper presented to the court] is not being presented for any im-
proper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or need-
lessly increase the cost of litigation; 
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Moreover, the amicus brief is an important part of “deliberative de-
mocracy,” a theory that favors fully informed debate as a condition to 
democratic society.22 
 In Part II of this Article, I survey the use and potential abuse of 
amicus participation. Then, in Part III, I will discuss the First 
Amendment values that amicus participation furthers. Next, in Part 
IV, this Article furthers a theoretical framework that places amicus 
participation in a democratic court system. Finally, in Part V, I sug-
gest a standard for accepting amicus briefs that will both make it 
easier to file amicus briefs and also reduce some of the abuses that 
amicus participation might raise. As I will discuss, this Article ar-
gues for a liberalization of amicus standards because of the constitu-
tional, ethical, and democratic implications of amicus participation. 
 The main tenet of this Article is that amicus participation plays 
an important role in the democratic process. This Article views the 
amicus brief not just as an element of interest group lobbying in to-
day’s society—even though it might have that purpose or effect—but 
rather as an integral part of participatory democracy. A review of 
Judge Posner’s writings confirms that his suspicion of amicus briefs 
may be related to his theories regarding the nature of democracy.23 
Moreover, amicus participation, because it is rooted in the right to 
petition, is an integral part of social movements. For all these rea-
sons, courts should be liberal in granting leave to file amicus briefs. 
                                                                                                                     
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by 
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or 
reversing existing law or for establishing new law; 
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so 
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable op-
portunity for further investigation or discovery; and  
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, 
if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of 
information. 
Id. 
 22. Matthew D. Adler, Welfare Polls: A Synthesis, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1875, 1877-78 
(2006); David M. Estlund, Who’s Afraid of Deliberative Democracy? On the Strate-
gic/Deliberative Dichotomy in Recent Constitutional Jurisprudence, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1437 
(1993); Ethan J. Lieb, Can Direct Democracy Be Made Deliberative?, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 903, 
904 (2006). 
 23. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 16-18 (2003) (arguing in 
favor of Schumpeterian democracy over deliberative democracy). 
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II.   FRIENDLY FIRE: DIFFERING APPROACHES TO AMICUS BRIEFS 
A.   Federal Court Rules: “Does the Brief Add Anything New?” 
1.   A Summary of Amicus Rules 
 Although amicus participation dates to Roman law, court rules 
regulating amici are a relatively recent phenomenon.24 Amicus rules 
vary in different courts, but a common theme is the requirement to 
avoid repeating arguments made by the parties.25 Since promulgat-
ing its first amicus rule in 1937, the United States Supreme Court 
has increasingly placed limits on amicus participation but rarely ever 
rejects amicus briefs.26 The number of amicus briefs filed in the U.S. 
Supreme Court began increasing in the 1980s.27 In the 1989 Webster 
v. Reproductive Health Services case, over eighty amicus briefs were 
filed involving 5,469 groups and individuals.28 In 2003, a total of 
eighty-two briefs were filed in the two cases arising from the Univer-
sity of Michigan’s affirmative action policies, Gratz v. Bollinger and 
Grutter v. Bollinger.29 
 United States Supreme Court Rule 37 states that an amicus brief 
“that brings to the attention of the Court relevant matter not already 
brought to its attention by the parties may be of considerable help to 
the Court.”30 All other briefs that do not serve to bring new, relevant 
matters to the Court are a burden and their filing is disfavored.31 Su-
preme Court Rule 9 requires all filings, with the exception of certain 
                                                                                                                     
 24. MCLAUCHLAN, supra note 3, at 3-5. McLauchlan notes that under Roman and 
English law, amici were often solicited by the court. Id. at 3. McLauchlan traces voluntary 
participation at least to 1695, when a Member of Parliament informed the court of his in-
terpretation of a statute the court was construing. Id. at 4 (citing Horton v. Ruesby, Comb, 
(1686) 90 Eng. Rep. 326 (K.B.)); Krislov, supra note 9, at 695. 
 25. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (challenging race based ad-
missions at the University of Michigan’s College of Literature, Science and the Arts); Grut-
ter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (challenging race based admissions at the Uni-
versity of Michigan’s law school). 
 26. A Westlaw search in the Supreme Court database (SCT) of “reject! /3 amic!” 
yielded no results. 
 27. See MCLAUCHLAN, supra note 3, at 6.  
 28. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). 
 29. Jonathan Alger & Marvin Krislov, You’ve Got to Have Friends: Lessons Learned 
from the Role of Amici in the University of Michigan Cases, 30 J.C. & U.L. 503 (2004) (dis-
cussing the roles of various amici—including the military, ethnic groups, the government, 
and professional organizations—and their influence in the Michigan cases). For a compila-
tion of the numerous amicus briefs, see University of Michigan, Admissions Lawsuits, 
Grutter and Gratz: Amicus Briefs, http://www.vpcomm.umich.edu/admissions/legal/ 
amicus.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2008). 
 30. SUP. CT. R. 37(1). 
 31. Id. 
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specified actions by prisoners, to be brought by a member of the Su-
preme Court bar. 32  
 Amicus rules in the federal circuit courts of appeal generally fol-
low the same pattern as the U.S. Supreme Court rules. Rule 29 of the 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure—which provides a template for 
the court rules of individual circuits—requires leave of court or the 
consent of all the parties to the filing of the brief.33 The theory behind 
this rule seems to be that the actual parties in the lawsuit (plaintiffs, 
defendants, and intervenors) have a right to decide whether to allow 
an outsider to muddy the waters. Moreover, there would seem to be 
strong disincentives for the existing parties to litigation to consent to 
the filing of an amicus brief that is contrary to their positions, thus 
necessitating leave of court in most cases.34  
 Individual circuits can adopt variations to the rules.35 The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, discourages the filing of “mul-
tiple amici curiae briefs raising the same points in support of one 
party.”36 Instead of filing briefs, parties are directed to file a “short 
letter” stating their agreement with factual or legal statements made 
                                                                                                                     
 32. SUP. CT. R. 9(1). Admission to the Supreme Court bar is generally open to attor-
neys admitted to the bar of any state for at least thee years and in good standing. SUP. CT. 
R. 5(1). 
 33. FED. R. APP. P. 29(a); David B. Smallman, Amicus Practice: New Rules for Old 
Friends, 25 LITIG. 25 (1999); Tony Mauro, Court Gets a Tad Less Friendly to Amici, LEGAL 
TIMES, Feb. 19, 1990, at 10. 
 34. Federal district courts have also seen an increase in the number of amicus briefs 
filed in recent years. Cf. Michael K. Lowman, The Litigating Amicus Curiae: When Does 
the Party Begin After the Friends Leave? 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1243, 1256 (1992) (noting that 
amicus participation “commonly” appears at all levels of the federal court system). State 
courts have varying rules for amicus briefs. See, e.g., CAL. R. CT. 8.204(b) (affidavit must 
state the nature of the applicant’s interest and set forth facts or questions of law that have 
not adequately been presented by the parties and their relevancy to the disposition of the 
case); ILL. ST. S. CT. R. 345, available at http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Rules/ 
Art_III/ArtIII.htm#345 (applicants must state their interest and how the brief will assist 
the court). 
 35. See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 29. D.C. CIR. LOCAL R. 29(a) (“The brief must avoid repe-
tition of facts or legal arguments made in the principal (appellant/petitioner or appel-
lee/respondent) brief and focus on points not made or adequately elaborated upon in the 
principal brief, although relevant to the issues before this court.”); 3D CIR. LOCAL R. 29.1 
(“Before completing the preparation of an amicus brief, counsel for an amicus curiae shall 
attempt to ascertain the arguments that will be made in the brief of any party whose posi-
tion the amicus is supporting, with a view to avoiding any unnecessary repetition or re-
statement of those arguments in the amicus brief.”); 5TH CIR. LOCAL R. 29.2 (“The brief 
should avoid the repetition of facts or legal arguments contained in the principal brief and 
should focus on points either not made or not adequately discussed in those briefs.”); 5TH. 
CIR. LOCAL R. 29.4 (“After a panel opinion is issued, amicus curiae status will not be per-
mitted if the allowance would result in the disqualification of any member of the panel or 
of the en banc court.”); 9TH CIR. R. 29-1, CIR. ADV. COMM. NOTE (“The filing of multiple 
amici curiae briefs raising the same points in support of one party is disfavored.”); 10TH 
CIR. LOCAL R. 29.1 (“The court will receive but not file proposed amicus briefs on rehear-
ing.”).  
 36. CIR. ADVISORY COMM., NOTE TO R. 29-1, available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ 
ca9/Documents.nsf/c9254affb51940d288257316006b454d/$FILE/FRAP_0707.pdf. 
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in the other parties’ briefs. Most of the other variations in circuit 
court rules simply caution amicus filers not to repeat arguments al-
ready made by the parties.37  
 Sometimes, courts reach out to experts to file amicus briefs.38 The 
Federal Circuit, for example, maintains a list of bar and other asso-
ciations which will be invited to file briefs when the court directs.39 
The Supreme Court regularly invites the Solicitor General of the 
United States to submit the views of the federal government in the 
form of amicus briefs, and no leave of court is required for the Solici-
tor General to file an amicus brief.40 Often litigants file a brief on be-
half of no party, but file instead for the court’s benefit and to discuss 
the broader implications of the court’s ruling.41 Thus, amicus briefs 
can serve important functions for the courts. 
 State and federal trial courts have received an increasing number 
of amicus briefs in recent years, but they do not generally have sepa-
rate rules on the acceptance of amicus briefs, and instead follow the 
rules of the appeals courts.42 Perhaps because of the increasing num-
ber of briefs being filed, more and more district courts are taking 
their leads from appellate decisions such as those written by Judge 
Posner.43 An increasing number of amicus briefs are being filed in 
state supreme courts and intermediate appellate courts as well. 
These courts generally have rules about the filing of amicus briefs 
that mirror the federal courts.44 
                                                                                                                     
 37. See id. Paul M. Smith, The Sometimes Troubled Relationship Between Courts and 
Their “Friends”, 24 LITIG. 24 (1998). 
 38. FED. R. APP. P. 21(b)(4) allows for federal courts of appeal to invite amicus curiae 
briefs from U.S. District Courts in mandamus proceedings. A recent example occurred in a 
case involving the criminal tax prosecution of KPMG. Brief of U.S. District Judge Lewis A. 
Kaplan as Amicus Curiae, Stein v. KPMG, LLP, 486 F.3d 753 (2d Cir. 2007), available at 
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/files/kaplan_brief.pdf. 
 39. FED. CIR. R. 29(b) (“The clerk will maintain a list of bar associations and other or-
ganizations to be invited to file amicus curiae briefs when the court directs. Bar associa-
tions and other organizations will be placed on the list if they request. The request must be 
renewed annually not later than October 1.”). 
 40. SUP. CT. R. 37(4). Leave of court is also not required for an authorized law officer 
of a state, county, city, or town. Id. 
 41. SUP. CT. R. 37(3)(a) (allowing amicus briefs to be filed on behalf of either party).  
 42. Animal Prot. Inst. v. Martin, No. CV-06-128 BW, 2007 WL 647567, at *3 (D. Me. 
Feb. 23, 2007) (following Judge Alito’s approach); Triad Int’l Maint. Corp. v. S. Air Transp., 
Inc., No. 2:04-CV-1200, 2005 WL 1917512, at *1-3. (S.D. Ohio Aug. 10, 2005) (applying 
Fed. R. App. P. 29 in a bankruptcy court appeal); U.S. v. Alkaabi, 223 F. Supp. 2d 583, 592-
93 (D.N.J. 2002) (following the 3d Circuit’s application of Fed. R. App. P. 29).  
 43. See Cobell v. Norton, 246 F. Supp. 2d 59, 62-63 (D.D.C. 2003) (rejecting an amicus 
brief by an Indian tribe on the ground that doing so would encourage other tribes to ex-
pand the already “extensive record in the case”); Georgia v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 25, 
33 (D.D.C. 2002) (denying the ACLU’s motion for leave to file an amicus brief in support of 
the government on the ground that the United States was “more than adequately repre-
sented”). 
 44. See, e.g., CAL. R. CT. 8.200(c)(1), 8.520(f)(1) (“any person” may file an application 
for amicus participation). 
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 Many courts also have similar procedures for requesting permis-
sion to file amicus briefs.45 The rules often require the amicus party 
to file a proposed brief so the court can evaluate it before deciding 
whether to allow the brief to be filed.46 Some courts require the 
amicus party to obtain consent of all the parties before an amicus 
brief may be filed.47 Most courts also require a statement of economic 
interests with all filings, to determine whether or not judges on the 
court have to recuse themselves.48 
 The current standard for most amicus briefs—whether the pro-
posed brief provides duplicative material—is too vague and indeter-
minate to give enough guidance for amicus filers to know whether or 
not their filings are welcome. For judges to apply the current rules 
faithfully, they might need to comb through the briefs to determine 
whether the amicus briefs add anything new to the case. The prob-
lem is that the judge would need to go through the briefs in order to 
determine this, which seems like a waste of scarce judicial resources. 
Perhaps this is the reason that many amicus briefs are accepted for 
filing. As I will describe in Part V, a new standard is needed to make 
clearer when amicus briefs should be accepted and make it more 
likely that they will be accepted. 
2.   Amicus Briefs and the Courts’ Power to Sanction 
 Federal judges have broad authority to regulate what is filed in 
their courts.49 FRCP 11 provides for sanctions against parties, their 
attorneys, or both, when they file any “paper” in federal court that is 
frivolous.50 It is unclear whether any attorneys have been sanctioned 
under Rule 11 for filing a frivolous amicus brief.51 Further, it is like-
wise unclear whether the clients of amicus filers would even be con-
sidered “parties” within the meaning of the rules. Federal courts pos-
sess inherent authority to sanction amicus parties, but it is unclear 
that courts have ever sanctioned amicus parties using Rule 11.52 
                                                                                                                     
 45. Julie Gannon Shoop, Too Many ‘Friends’: Appeals Judge Urges Limits on Amicus 
Briefs, TRIAL, Dec. 1997, at 18; Tony Mauro, Plenty of Friendly Advice, LEGAL TIMES, July 
23, 1990, at S25. 
 46. 11TH CIR. R. 35-8; FED. CIR. R. 29. 
 47. Marcia Coyle, Amicus Disclosure Worries Some Amici, NAT’L L. J. 1, Apr. 1996, at 
A14. 
 48. See, e.g., 9th CIR. R. 26.1 available at http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ca9/Documents. 
nsf/FRAP+and+Circuit+Rules?OpenView (requiring a corporate disclosure statement of 
parent corporations which are publicly held so that judges may evaluate their stock owner-
ship).  
 49. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2000). 
 50. FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
 51. A search of Westlaw and Lexis databases returned no results. 
 52. See A. Hirsh, Inc. v. United States, 948 F.2d 1240, 1250-51 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[A 
statue imposing sanctions] speaks to the ‘excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees rea-
sonably incurred . . .,’ [and] ordinarily the statute is referring to burdens a party imposes 
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 Because of the broad guidelines for acceptance of amicus briefs, 
there seem to be few examples of federal judges rejecting the filing of 
amicus briefs. Often, the rejection of amicus briefs appears in state 
court cases and seems more related to the gamesmanship of the per-
sons filing the amicus brief than the content of the brief itself. For 
example, in Thalheim v. Town of Greenwich,53 an attorney filed a 
writ of error in the Supreme Court of Connecticut upon being sanc-
tioned by a Connecticut appellate court for violating local rules of 
practice by filing an amicus brief in a case without first obtaining 
permission from court or filing an appearance in the case. Although 
not a party to the case, the attorney filed a direct appeal to a lower 
court decision.54 
 In Thalheim, the appellant challenged the constitutionality of the 
amicus rules, arguing that they infringed on his First Amendment 
right to “ ‘petition the government for redress of grievances.’ ”55 The 
court disagreed because the rules of practice did not prohibit the fil-
ing of an amicus brief, but instead required him to first obtain per-
mission from court, and thus did not implicate the “right to petition 
the government” clause of the First Amendment.56 In its holding, the 
court did not discuss the general implications of the First Amend-
ment on amicus brief filings. The court noted that Appellant did not 
raise a claim under the “free speech” clause.57 
 The Thalheim case is a limited test of the constitutional claims of 
this Article, to be discussed in Part III. The Thalheim case, however, 
is of limited usefulness to the question of whether the right to file an 
amicus is granted by the petition clause of the First Amendment. 
First, as a state supreme court case, it has limited influence on the 
federal courts, where this issue will most often be raised. Second, the 
case may have been marked more by the gamesmanship of the attor-
ney than a definitive ruling on the constitutional arguments about 
amicus briefs. Third, the court did not discuss the free speech impli-
cations of filing amicus briefs. Although other courts have followed 
Thalheim, the constitutional status of amicus briefs is an open ques-
tion. 58  
                                                                                                                     
on the opposing party. Here, [petitioner] is not a party but an amicus.”). A search of FRCP 
11 cases in the Westlaw database revealed no instances of sanctions being imposed on fil-
ers of amicus briefs. 
 53. 775 A.2d 947 (Conn. 2001). 
 54. Id. at 954. 
 55. Id. at 956. 
 56. Id. at 957. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See State v. Ross, 272 Conn. 577, 611-13 (Conn. 2005); Witty v. Planning & Zoning 
Comm’n of Hartland, 66 Conn. App. 387, 396 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001) (amicus brief cannot be 
partisan); see also Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 857 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. 2005) (order of the 
Illinois Supreme Court denying leave to file an amicus brief by the U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce). The Illinois Supreme Court has recently promulgated a rule that an amicus filer 
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B.   Diverging Views of Amicus Briefs in the Courts of Appeals 
 Although courts do not often reject amicus briefs, one particularly 
influential appellate judge, Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit, 
has expressed skepticism about the value of some amicus briefs.59 Al-
though these cases are somewhat isolated, Judge Posner’s status as a 
prominent judge and intellectual means that his decisions rejecting 
amicus briefs may encourage other judges to reject amicus briefs.60 
Thus, a closer examination of these cases is warranted. 
 In Ryan v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Judge Pos-
ner, sitting alone, denied the Chicago Board of Trade leave to file an 
amicus brief in a disciplinary proceeding brought by the Commission 
in the Seventh Circuit. Judge Posner refused to accept the brief, stat-
ing that “[a]fter 16 years of reading amicus curiae briefs the vast ma-
jority of which have not assisted the judges, I have decided that it 
would be good to scrutinize these motions in a more careful, indeed a 
fish-eyed, fashion.”61 Judge Posner elaborated on the standard he 
would use in the future: 
An amicus brief should normally be allowed when a party is not 
represented competently or is not represented at all, when the 
amicus has an interest in some other case that may be affected by 
the decision in the present case (though not enough affected to en-
title the amicus to intervene and become a party in the present 
case), or when the amicus has unique information or perspective 
that can help the court beyond the help that the lawyers for the 
parties are able to provide.62  
                                                                                                                     
that fills its legal brief with legal arguments duplicative of those made by the parties may 
be sanctioned and ordered to pay the reasonable costs of the other parties. ILL. S. CT. R. 
345, available at http://www.state.il.us/court/SupremeCourt/Rules/Art_III/ArtIII.htm#345; 
see Ex Ante, Inamicable, 9 GREEN BAG 104 (2006) (discussing the Supreme Court of Illi-
nois’ revised Rule 345).  
 59. Voices for Choices v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542, 544-45 (7th Cir. 2003); Nat’l 
Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 223 F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 2000); Ryan v. Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Comm’n, 125 F.3d 1062 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 60. See Liberty Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Mktg. Corp., 149 F.R.D. 65, 83 (D. N.J. 
1993) (rejecting amicus brief); Yip v. Pagano, 606 F. Supp. 1566, 1568 (D. N.J. 1985) (al-
lowing amicus brief); cf. Sierra Club, Inc. v. E.P.A., 358 F.3d 516, 518 (7th Cir. 2004) (deny-
ing intervention and opining that the party seeking to intervene does not even justify 
amicus status: “Courts value submissions not to see how the interest groups line up, but to 
learn about facts and legal perspectives that the litigants have not adequately developed.”); 
Glassroth v. Moore, 347 F.3d 916, 919 (11th. Cir. 2003) (time spent preparing amicus briefs 
was not compensable); see also Martha Minow, Religion and the Burden of Proof: Posner’s 
Economics and Pragmatism in Metzl v. Leininger, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1175, 1185-86 (2007); 
Francesco Parisi & Ben W.F. Depoorter, Private Choices and Public Law: Richard A. Pos-
ner’s Contributions to Family Law and Policy, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 403, 404-
05 (2001); David Cole, The Poverty of Posner’s Pragmatism: Balancing Away Liberty After 
9/11, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1735 (2007) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: 
THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY (2006)).  
 61. Ryan, 125 F.3d at 1063. 
 62. Id. 
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Any amicus brief not meeting the above criteria, Judge Posner con-
cluded, should be denied.63 
 In 2000, Judge Posner was part of a panel of three judges that de-
nied leave to file an amicus brief in National Organization for 
Women v. Scheidler,64 a case with a long litigation history that in-
cluded several trips to the Supreme Court.65 The case involved abor-
tion clinic protests and whether the Hobbs Act, which prevents rob-
bery or extortion, would support an injunction against the protests.66 
The court denied the amicus briefs of Priests for Life, Life Legal De-
fense Foundation, and the Southern Christian Leadership Confer-
ence in support of antiabortion activists.67 The court reiterated the 
three conditions for the acceptance of amicus brief discussed above in 
Ryan.68 The court justified these standards on three grounds, gener-
ally that (1) it would be irresponsible to accept a brief “and then not 
read it (or at least glance at it, or require our law clerks to read it)”; 
(2) amicus briefs are often an attempt by parties to evade a court’s 
page limitations; and (3) “[a]micus curiae briefs are often attempts to 
inject interest-group politics into the federal appellate process by 
flaunting the interest of a trade association or other interest group in 
the outcome of the appeal.”69 The court denied the motion of the three 
putative amicus parties, though amicus briefs from other filers were 
allowed by the court in the subsequent appeal on the merits.70  
 Three years later, in 2003, Judge Posner denied a motion for leave 
to file an amicus brief in Voices for Choices, Inc. v. Illinois Bell Tele-
phone Co.71 The briefs in that case were presented by state officials 
and a labor union on the grounds that the parties in the case, a con-
sumer group and a large telephone utility company, did not represent 
all viewpoints.72 Judge Posner, sitting alone, rejected the briefs on 
the following grounds: (1) the existing parties were adequately repre-
sented; (2) the amici had no direct interest in another case that may 
be materially affected by decision in this one; (3) the amici had no 
distinct perspective or additional information; and (4) the viewpoint 
of state officials was no different than that of party Southwestern 
                                                                                                                     
 63. Id. 
 64. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v Scheidler, 223 F.3d 615 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 65. Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 547 U.S. 9 (2006); Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. 
for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393 (2003); Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249 
(1994). 
 66. Scheidler, 547 U.S. at 13-14. 
 67. Scheidler, 223 F.3d at 616-17. 
 68. Id. at 617. 
 69. Id. at 616-17. 
 70. See, e.g., Brief for James Serritella et al., as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellant, 
Nat’l Org. For Women v. Scheidler, 267 F.3d 687 (7th. Cir. 2001) (Nos. 99-3336, 99-3892, 
99-3891, 99-3076-01-2050).  
 71. 339 F.3d 542 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 72. Id. at 543-44. 
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Bell Corporation.73 Judge Posner acknowledged that under court 
rules the State of Illinois could file a brief without leave of court, but 
the legislators were not purporting to speak on behalf of the state.74 
“Essentially, the proposed amicus briefs merely announce the ‘vote’ 
of the amici on the decision of the appeal. But, as I have been at 
pains to emphasize in contrasting the legislative and judicial proc-
esses, they have no vote,” wrote Judge Posner.75 
 In a related context, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals denied 
the attorney’s fees that a successful party sought for the time spent 
reading and responding to amicus briefs. In Glassroth v. Moore, the 
court was concerned that compensating for work done in connection 
with supporting amicus briefs would only encourage more amicus 
briefs, which the court was “loathe to do.”76 The court stated, however 
that a reasonable amount of time spent reading and responding to 
opposing amicus briefs would continue to be compensable.77 
 Although Judge Posner is an influential jurist and academic, not 
all appellate judges have followed his decisions on amicus briefs. In 
an opinion on the Third Circuit Court of Appeals before his appoint-
ment to the United States Supreme Court, Judge Samuel Alito con-
sidered Judge Posner’s amicus decisions in Neonatology Associates, 
P.A. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.78 Neonatology Associates 
was an appeal from a tax court decision where five physicians sought 
leave to file an amicus brief in support of the Commissioner of Inter-
nal Revenue.79 The taxpayer appellants, two professional medical 
corporations, were defending against a government prosecution for 
erroneous deductions and back taxes. The taxpayers argued that the 
court should not accept the brief because the doctors were not “im-
partial,” and did not have a “pecuniary interest” in the outcome.80 
The doctors argued that their amicus brief should be filed because 
they wanted to preserve certain factual findings to connect the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to findings in the tax court below. 
They also wanted to question the application of the Employee Re-
tirement Income and Security Act (ERISA) to the case.81 The doctors 
                                                                                                                     
 73. Id. at 545-46.  
 74. Id. at 545. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Glassroth v. Moore, 347 F.3d 916, 919 (11th. Cir. 2003) (“[A]micus briefs are often 
used as a means of evading the page limitations on a party’s briefs.” (citing Voices for 
Choices, 339 F.3d at 544)).  
 77. Id. 
 78. 293 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 79. Id. at 130. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
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thus did not seem very interested in whether or not the medical cor-
porations had taken proper deductions.82 
 Judge Alito considered Judge Posner’s line of decisions regarding 
amicus filings and ultimately allowed the amicus brief to be filed. As 
to impartiality, Judge Alito decided that this conception of the 
amicus curiae became “outdated long ago.”83 Judge Alito wrote that 
the idea that a friend of the court cannot also be a friend of the party 
is “contrary to the fundamental assumption of our adversary system 
that strong (but fair) advocacy on behalf of opposing views promotes 
sound decision making.”84 
 In Neonatology Associates, Judge Alito considered an earlier Third 
Circuit case that seemed to limit the ability of parties to file amicus 
briefs. In American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. 
Thornburgh, a case that ultimately went to the Supreme Court re-
garding the constitutionality of abortion restrictions, the Third Cir-
cuit denied the motion of a group of law professors to file an amicus 
brief because the professors did not “represent any individual or or-
ganization with a legally cognizable interest in the subject matter at 
issue . . . only their concern about the manner in which this court will 
interpret the law . . . .”85 Judge Alito did not decide whether the 
American College court accurately interpreted the “interest” re-
quirement, but he felt that doctors in the case had adequately 
showed an interest in the outcome and allowed their brief.86 
 Judge Alito’s decision to allow the amicus brief in Neonatology As-
sociates may or may not be a bellwether for how he will treat amicus 
briefs as a Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court. His opinion shows the 
difficulties judges face in determining the degree of interest a party 
filing an amicus brief has, and whether some parties have too great a 
vested interest in the outcome of the matter. While the court deci-
sions denying leave to file amicus briefs are a small sample of the 
large number of amicus briefs that are accepted for filing, they repre-
sent a trend that might make it more difficult to file amicus briefs. 
 Despite the split between the circuits, a number of district court 
judges have followed Judge Posner’s reasoning.87 Perhaps as a reac-
tion to an increasing number of amicus briefs in high profile cases, 
                                                                                                                     
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 131. 
 84. Id. 
 85. 699 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir. 1983); see Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & 
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (ruling on the constitutionality of various provisions of 
the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act). 
 86. Neonatology Assocs., 293 F.3d at 133. 
 87. Hughes v. White, 388 F. Supp. 2d 805, 817 n.3 (S.D. Ohio 2005); Dow Chem. Co. v. 
U.S., No. 00-CV -10331-BC, 2002 WL 33012185, at *1-2 (E.D. Mich. May 24, 2002). 
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some trial court judges have sought demanding showings of why a 
particular amicus brief would add to the arguments of the parties.88  
C.   Recent Controversies Involving Amicus Participation 
 Recent briefs filed by law professors, retired judges, and members 
of Congress have sparked controversy and may lead to judicial sen-
timent against amicus status and more frequent denials of amicus 
briefs.89 In some cases, legislators have filed amicus briefs to draw at-
tention to certain parts of legislative history to influence the courts’ 
interpretation of legislation. When the Supreme Court was consider-
ing a major case involving court jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus 
claims, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Senators John Kyl and Lindsey Gra-
ham filed an amicus brief to argue that Congress intended to strip 
the courts of jurisdiction.90 Some argued that the senators misled the 
court in coloring the legislative history to deprive the court of juris-
diction.91  
 In another case related to the U.S. detention facility at Guan-
tanamo, a group of former judges sought leave to file an amicus brief 
in support of greater due process for the detainees.92 The court denied 
leave to file the brief because the former judges identified themselves 
as judges.93 The court’s brief order, joined by Judge Sentelle and 
Judge Randolph, cited an advisory opinion of the Judicial Conference 
of the United States, that states: “Judges should insure that the title 
                                                                                                                     
 88. Abu-Jamal v. Horn, No. CIV.A. 99-5089, 2000 WL 1100784, at *3-5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 
7, 2000) (amicus rejected in high profile case in part to avoid the potential onslaught of 
more amicus filings). 
 89. The recent criminal prosecution and sentencing of I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby in-
volved an amicus brief. A group of law professors filed a nine page motion for leave to file 
an amicus brief in support of Libby. Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae and 
Brief of Law Professors Vikram Amar et al., United States v. Libby, 495 F.Supp.2d 49 
(D.D.C. 2007) (No 05-394). In handing down Mr. Libby’s sentence, Judge Reggie Walton 
stated that the professors’ brief had little value in his decision: “With all due respect, these 
are intelligent people, but I would not accept this brief from a first year law student. I be-
lieve this was put out to put pressure on this court in the public sphere to rule as you 
wish.” John W. Dean, Scooter Libby’s Appeal: The Focus Shifts to the Highly Political U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, FINDLAW’S WRIT, June 15, 2007, 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20070615.html. 
 90. Brief for Sen. Graham and Sen. Kyl as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184) (holding that the military com-
missions for detainees at Guantanamo Bay violate the Constitution); see also David L. 
Hudson, Detainees Have Some Powerful Friends, 2 No. 45 A.B.A. J. E-Rep. 1, Nov. 14, 
2003. 
 91. Emily Bazelon, Invisible Men, SLATE, Mar. 27, 2006, 
http://www.slate.com/id/2138750; John W. Dean, Senators Kyl and Graham’s Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld Scam: The Deceptive Amicus Brief They Filed in the Guantanamo Detainee Case, 
FINDLAW’S WRIT, July 5, 2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20060705.html. 
 92. Adam Liptak, Appeals Court Rejects Brief Submitted by Ex-Judges, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 30, 2006, at A15. 
 93. Id. 
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‘judge’ is not used in the courtroom or in papers involved in litigation 
before them to designate a former judge, unless the designation is 
necessary to describe accurately a person’s status at a time pertinent 
to the lawsuit.”94 In dissent from the court’s order, Judge Rogers 
stated that even if the former federal judges had used their judicial 
titles, this was not a reason to reject the brief.95 
 These recent cases illustrate that nonparties are increasingly us-
ing amicus briefs to participate in the courts in ways similar to other 
democratic forums. As with all facets of the democratic process, there 
is potential for abuse by citizens, and, in some cases, legislators. 
Such abuses may make judges less willing to accept amicus briefs. 
These incidents also raise important questions about the role of 
judges and legislators in a democratic system, which I will address 
below. 
D.   Amicus Participation as Interest Group Activity 
 One of the most frequent objections to amicus briefs is that they 
are a nefarious form of interest group activity.96 With the rising in-
fluence of moneyed interests in politics, there is growing concern 
about governmental decisions being made under the sway of these 
interests.97 Special interest influence exists in the courts because 
those who have sufficient resources can engage in extensive litiga-
tion.98 Interest groups have utilized the current amicus rules to file 
an increasingly larger number of briefs. Although amicus briefs do 
not require vast resources, groups with greater resources are more 
likely to file them.99 If well-heeled interest groups file amicus briefs 
unimpeded, the arguments of groups with lesser resources might be 
lost. 
                                                                                                                     
 94. Judicial Conf. of the U.S., Comm. on Codes of Conduct, Advisory Op. 72 (Feb. 2, 
1982), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/72.html. 
 95. Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 934, 935 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Rogers, J., dissenting). 
 96. Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in 
the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. No. 4 1109, 1111 (1988); Fowler V. Harper 
& Edwin D. Etherington, Lobbyists Before the Court, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 1172, 1172 (1953); 
Alexander Wohl, Friends with Agendas: Amicus Curiae Briefs May Be More Popular than 
Persuasive, 82 A.B.A. J. 46, 46-48 (1996). 
 97. See, e.g., JOHN R. MCARTHUR, THE SELLING OF FREE TRADE: NAFTA, 
WASHINGTON, AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000) (describing how 
powerful interests lobbied for the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement).  
 98. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs 
on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 787  n.146 (2000) (discussing how resources 
reflect the extent of amicus participation). 
 99. See generally Gregg Ivers & Karen O’Connor, Friends as Foes: The Amicus Curiae 
Participation and Effectiveness of the American Civil Liberties Union and Americans for 
Effective Law Enforcement in Criminal Cases, 1969-1982, 9 LAW & POL’Y 161 (1987) (illus-
trating the impact of two organizations with resources). 
332 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:315 
 
 There are immediate difficulties with characterizing amicus activ-
ity as “interest group politics.” First, interest group politics are at the 
heart of a representative democracy.100 Second, amicus participation 
can serve to level the playing field by providing a relatively low cost 
option for groups to band together and influence governmental pol-
icy. Third, because the Solicitor General can often file briefs on be-
half of the government, the ability of nongovernmental groups to 
have broad access to the courts adds to the voices heard in the deci-
sionmaking process. Finally, while amicus participation raises con-
cerns relating to the imbalance of resources that may skew amicus 
participation toward the wealthy, these concerns are no different 
than in any other area of litigation, and should be a reason for 
greater access to justice resources, rather than limiting amicus fil-
ings.101 
 Judge Posner’s concerns about the infiltration of interest group 
politics in the litigation process coincides with his views supporting 
Schumpeterian democracy, which idealizes democracy as a clash be-
tween organized interests.102 Joseph Schumpeter was an early twen-
tieth century Austrian economist, positing that those with ample 
wealth have access to the democratic process.103 In Posner’s book 
Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy, he describes deliberative democ-
racy as a competing philosophy to his own Schumpeterian philoso-
phy.104 Of course, Judge Posner’s theory is primarily intended for leg-
islative politics; a preference for Schumpeterian politics need not dic-
tate the judicial process. 
 The pragmatist view that Judge Posner espouses as the preferred 
mode of adjudication works better with a more open attitude toward 
amicus briefs. Pragmatic solutions will most likely come from a 
greater number of voices in the decisionmaking process. Economic 
theory, which favors the role of information, also supports greater ac-
cess for amicus filers to the courts than Judge Posner seems to allow. 
Often, amicus parties can provide needed information to judges, as in 
scientific and technical areas.105 For example, in a recent antitrust 
                                                                                                                     
 100. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DILEMMAS OF PLURALIST DEMOCRACY: AUTONOMY VS. 
CONTROL 1 (1982) (noting that independent organizations are highly desirable in a democ-
racy, even though they also present the opportunity to do harm). 
 101. But see Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the 
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974) (showing the value of repeat player 
status); Donald Songer et al., Why the Haves Don’t Always Come Out Ahead: Repeat Play-
ers Meet Amici Curiae for the Disadvantaged, 53 POL. RES. Q. 537 (2000). 
 102. POSNER, supra note 23, at 14. 
 103. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (4th ed. 
1976); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-
Group Perspective, 18 J.L. ECON. 875 (1975).  
 104. POSNER, supra note 23, at 192-93.  
 105. James F. Spriggs, II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Amicus Curiae and the Role of Informa-
tion at the Supreme Court, 50 POL. RES. Q. 365, 366 (1997). 
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case in the U.S. Supreme Court, a group of economists filed an 
amicus brief supporting a rule that would not hold retail minimum 
pricing agreements per se illegal in Leegin Creative Leather Products, 
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.106 In the opinion for the Court, Justice Kennedy 
cited the economists’ view as a reason for the overruling of a ninety-
year-old antitrust precedent: “Respected economic analysts . . . con-
clude that vertical price restraints can have precompetitive ef-
fects.”107 In this case, the views of amici seemed to have more weight 
than the principle of stare decisis.  
 The antitrust case discussed above suggests that powerful inter-
ests can use amicus briefs to influence court decisions.108 The concern 
about wealthy, powerful interests having a louder voice may be as-
suaged by the ability of smaller groups to form coalitions and have 
their voices heard. This is not much different, however, than the 
ways that small nonprofits form coalitions to pass legislation. In fact, 
an amicus standard that makes it easier to file briefs may serve to 
narrow existing power imbalances between powerful interests in so-
ciety that regularly litigate and those that are only able to file 
amicus briefs. 
 Even with an increase in the number of amicus briefs filed by in-
terest groups, there are democratic reasons why we should not be 
concerned about the increased filings of amicus briefs. In fact, as I 
will argue below, amicus participation is integral to a democratic 
court system. 
III. SITUATING AMICUS PARTICIPATION IN THE CONSTITUTION 
 The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides 
that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech . . . or the right . . . to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.”109 Litigation has been used for expression throughout 
history, and as a form of petition for the redress of grievances. This 
Part applies these principles to amicus participation on the theory 
that the First Amendment is considered one of the legal underpin-
nings of a democratic society. At the same time, the First Amend-
ment’s tension with egalitarian principles has been debated by schol-
                                                                                                                     
 106. 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007); see also Brief for Economists as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2705 (2007) (No. 
06-480), 2007 WL 173681. 
 107. 127 S. Ct. at 2710, 2714-15 (citing the Brief of Amici Curiae Economists). 
 108. Numerous interests filed amicus briefs in Leegin, including the American Petro-
leum Institute. See Brief for Am. Petroleum Inst. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
Leegin, 127 S. Ct. 2705 (No 06-480), 2007 WL 160781. 
 109. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
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ars.110 Nevertheless, if we are to evaluate the democratic need for 
amicus participation, the principles underlying the First Amendment 
should be examined. 
A.   Freedom of Speech 
 Amicus briefs, like all briefs, are a form of speech.111 There are 
limits, however, to free speech in the litigation context.112 Courts 
have inherent authority to sanction lawyers who violate ethical rules 
or engage in fraudulent speech.113 Litigation is rarely analyzed in the 
same ways as other types of speech, where close attention is paid to 
the type of speech and the location in which the speech takes place.114 
For example, political speech generally has stronger protection than 
other types of speech, such as commercial speech.115 While one can 
make a political speech quite freely on a public sidewalk, one cannot 
make the same speech from the audience in a courtroom, or the gal-
lery of a legislature, without being removed from the chambers. 
 The categorical approach to whether speech is protected by the 
First Amendment begins by identifying the place in which speech oc-
curs.116 This is called forum analysis. Speech that occurs in some lo-
cations—such as the town square or the public sidewalk—that have 
been used for speech since time immemorial have been afforded the 
strong protection of the traditional public forum.117 In a designated 
public forum, by contrast, the government may impose reasonable 
time, place, and manner restrictions on the speech, provided there 
                                                                                                                     
 110. See RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS?: HATE 
SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY AND THE NEW FIRST AMENDMENT (1997); MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., 
WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT (1993).  
 111. Christopher J. Peters, Adjudicative Speech and the First Amendment, 51 UCLA L. 
REV. 705, 791 (2004) (“Litigants have the free speech right to participate in . . . decisions 
that will bind them.”). 
 112. Id. (“[T]he value of participation necessitates both freedom of speech and con-
straints on that freedom.”). 
 113. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2000).  
 114. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (discuss-
ing how in traditional and designated public forums, the government may regulate the 
time, place, and manner of speech as long as the restrictions are “narrowly tailored to 
serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of 
communication”).  
 115. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 
U.S. 748 (1976).  
 116. Compare United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (statute prohibiting the car-
rying of any “public notice” in front of the U.S. Supreme Court was deemed unconstitu-
tional) with Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965) (statute prohibiting picketing “near 
courthouse” was constitutional). 
 117. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (“Wherever the title of 
streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the 
public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating 
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.”). 
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are other avenues for communication.118 It is difficult to place litiga-
tion generally and amicus participation specifically into a forum 
analysis. For one thing, courts are multilayered forums for speech. 
Witnesses are controlled in what they can say by the rules of evi-
dence and perjury cases, but otherwise they have wide berth to say 
whatever they want, whether it helps them or hurts them. Lawyers 
are even more controlled in the presentation of evidence, but they 
also have significant control over their opening and closing state-
ments.119 In briefs, outside of sanctions for clearly frivolous behavior, 
there are wide areas of legitimate advocacy in which lawyers are free 
to speak.120 
 As discussed above, treating litigation as a public forum is highly 
dependent on the context in which the speech takes place.121 Identify-
ing a public forum as traditional, such as sidewalks, parks, and areas 
that have been treated as open for time immemorial, gives the speech 
a high form of protection.122 The characterization of a place as a non-
public forum will lead to lesser speech protection, whether it is politi-
cal or nonpolitical speech.123 Even in a traditional or designated pub-
lic forum, there can be time, place, and manner restrictions as long 
as there are reasonably adequate alternatives for the speech. 
 The foregoing shows that First Amendment forum analysis does 
not apply well to the filing of briefs. Indeed, recent decisions of the 
Supreme Court suggest that litigation may be a separate category of 
speech deserving of special analysis.124 There is only one forum in 
which litigation takes place: the courts. Whether or not classified as 
a traditional, limited purpose or nonpublic, forum analysis makes lit-
tle sense in the context of litigation.  
 While the litigants may argue that there are no equally adequate 
alternatives to court filings to get their message to the judges in a 
court, the fact is that placing such arguments in the media and other 
avenues may be an equally good way to get their messages out. At 
the same time, the time, place, and manner regulations that are now 
utilized may fail the “reasonableness” test if they are vague enough 
to prevent litigants from knowing exactly which speech is being pro-
                                                                                                                     
 118. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677-78 (1998).  
 119. JULES LOBEL, SUCCESS WITHOUT VICTORY: LOST LEGAL BATTLES AND THE LONG 
ROAD TO JUSTICE IN AMERICA (2003). 
 120. See Jules Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, 52 UCLA L. REV. 477 (2004). 
 121. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985).  
 122. Hague, 307 U.S. at 515.  
 123. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (holding that a federal military reserva-
tion was not a public forum, and regulations relating to distributing leaflets and speeches 
were not unconstitutional). 
 124. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 546-49 (2001).  
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scribed.125 For these and other reasons that I will describe below, the 
right to file in court is more often premised on the First Amendment 
Right to Petition.  
B.   The Right to Petition 
 The First Amendment prohibits government interference with 
“the right of the people . . . to petition the government for a redress of 
grievances.”126 The United States Supreme Court recently held in BE 
& K Construction Co. v. NLRB that the right to petition protects 
even ill-motivated lawsuits as long as they are reasonably based in 
fact or law.127 Thus, the right to file a lawsuit is constitutionally pro-
tected.128 Indeed, one commentator has called the right to petition 
“nearly absolute.”129 Despite the breadth of the Petition Clause, the 
question of whether the filing of an amicus brief is protected by the 
Petition Clause has yet to be decided by a federal court. 
 A textual reading of the First Amendment suggests a narrow view 
of what the Petition Clause protects. The text of the First Amend-
ment presupposes protection for a grievance to be redressed.130 Like 
the concept of standing under Article III of the Constitution, the 
scope of the Petition clause would be narrowly constricted if it only 
applied to petitions for relief from a redressable harm. Unless a law-
suit has been filed, the filing of a brief would not likely be protected. 
By analogy, this narrow reading would exclude much of the petition 
activity, such as testifying before legislative bodies and at adminis-
                                                                                                                     
 125. Allison Lucas, Friends of the Court? The Ethics of Amicus Brief Writing in First 
Amendment Litigation, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1605 (1999) (analyzing the role of amici in 
two First Amendment cases).  
 126. U.S. CONST. amend I. (emphasis added) (incorporated to apply to the states in Git-
low v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925)). 
 127. BE & K Const. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516 (2002); see generally Frederick Schauer, 
Comment, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84 (1998) 
(evaluating how lawsuits are constitutionally protected though the courts have made insti-
tutional distinctions). 
 128. See Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of Access to Court Under the Petition Clause of 
the First Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 557 (1999) (arguing that the 
right exists to petition the court but as it currently extends only to winning claims, it 
should be expanded); Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The History and Sig-
nificance of the Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2153 (1998) (arguing that the right 
to petition has been historically significant, though it has recently collapsed into other 
First Amendment rights); James E. Pfander, Sovereign Immunity and the Right to Petition: 
Toward a First Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 
NW. U. L. REV. 899 (1997) (arguing for a very liberal interpretation of the petition clause). 
 129. Norman B. Smith, “Shall Make No Law Abridging . . .”: An Analysis of the Ne-
glected, but Nearly Absolute, Right of Petition, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1153, 1154 (1986). 
 130. See generally Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Downsizing the Right to Petition, 93 
NW. U. L. REV. 739, 740 (1999) (“Put simply, the constitutional right to petition the gov-
ernment for a redress of grievances is precisely—for want of a better phrase—the right to 
petition the government for a redress of grievances.”). 
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trative hearings, where the threshold for participation is a bare in-
terest in the outcome.131 
 The problem with this narrow view of the Petition Clause is that 
it excludes a large amount of activity that has historically been con-
sidered part of the Petition Clause.132 A broader, citizen participation 
view of the Petition Clause, which is advanced in this Article, would 
encompass the filing of amicus briefs, based on whether the party fil-
ing the brief had merely an interest in the outcome, a standard that 
is synonymous with the threshold for amicus briefs in the federal 
courts of appeal.133 The right to petition may be, and should be, pro-
tected by the Petition Clause of the First Amendment.134 
 It is not clear that the standing requirement of Article III should 
be applied to amicus filers since they are not parties to which the 
“case or controversy” requirement of Article III was meant to ap-
ply.135 If the parties to the original litigation have standing, it would 
be odd to prevent amicus parties from weighing in on a live case or 
controversy. Indeed, even the most restrictive decisions on amicus 
briefs allow amicus filings as long as the amicus filer has “an interest 
in the outcome;” the only problem is that select judges tend to con-
strue that interest very narrowly.136 
 Because lawsuits are protected by the First Amendment and are 
subject to a great degree of court control, the question of whether 
amicus briefs are constitutionally protected does not answer how the 
courts should regulate them. Nevertheless, amicus participation has 
many of the same constitutional implications as litigation, most 
clearly seen in cases involving the meaning of constitutional provi-
sions. In many cases, amicus participation is used not only as a way 
of making views known to the tribunal hearing the case, but also as a 
way of making views known to the group’s constituents and to the 
general public. In this way, amicus participation serves an expres-
sive function in a democratic system. While there remain many ways 
                                                                                                                     
 131. For an analysis of the protection afforded “public comment,” see, for example, Pis-
cottano v. Town of Somers, 396 F. Supp. 2d 187, 206 (D. Conn. 2005), where a citizen al-
leged the town of Somers violated her right to speak at a board of selectmen meeting when 
it did not allow her to speak regarding a town employee. 
 132. See Leo Pfeffer, Amici in Church-State Litigation, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 
(1981) (examining the increase in amici filings regarding the establishment clause after 
World War II); Kevin H. Smith, Certiorari and the Supreme Court Agenda: An Empirical 
Analysis, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 727 (2001) (evaluating how the Court agenda determines certio-
rari and its effects); Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right to Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 667 (2003) (describing the history of the Petition Clause).  
 133. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 35-36 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 134. See Joan Steinman, Irregulars: The Appellate Rights of Persons Who Are Not Full-
Fledged Parties, 39 GA. L. REV. 411, 524 (2005) (allowing aggrieved nonparties to appeal 
would “enhance the coherence of our law”). 
 135. U.S. CONST. art. III., § 2, cl. 1. 
 136. See, e.g., the decisions of Judge Posner, discussed supra Part II; supra note 59. 
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to express one’s views, filing an amicus brief is an important way to 
show an organization’s commitment to an issue. In sum, amicus par-
ticipation is often about more than simply communicating to the 
court; it is often part of a campaign about important political and so-
cial issues. 
IV.   AMICUS PARTICIPATION IN THE FRAMEWORK OF A DEMOCRATIC 
SYSTEM 
 Besides the constitutional implications of restrictive rules for 
amicus activity discussed above, amicus participation plays an im-
portant role in a democratic court system. Amicus briefs open a dia-
logue between the people and the legislative branches. Additionally, 
amicus briefs are a way for citizens to provide input into questions of 
constitutional law. Finally, there is a deliberative purpose to amicus 
participation. In this Part, I will discuss several ways in which 
amicus participation enhances the functioning of the American de-
mocratic system.   
A.   The “Notice and Comment” Function of Amicus Participation 
 In statutory cases dealing with the work of executive branch 
agencies, amicus briefs can serve as an opportunity for interested 
parties to provide comment on administrative rulemaking. Often, 
these cases are litigated by the agency on behalf of the person who 
was actually victimized by the violation of law. These cases often 
deal with statutes that have been passed subject to the notice and 
comment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act, where in-
terested parties testify before administrative agencies on the impact 
of proposed rulemaking.137 Amicus participation can perform a simi-
lar function in cases interpreting statutes.138 
 Labor and employment law cases in particular raise the issue of 
administrative agencies representing the interests of individuals who 
are the victims of statutory violations.139 The United States Supreme 
                                                                                                                     
 137. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000). 
 138. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative 
Democracy in Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 623 (2006) (arguing about the impor-
tance of the notice and comment process to the development of environmental law); David 
S. Ruder, The Development of Legal Doctrine Through Amicus Participation: The SEC Ex-
perience, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 1167, 1169. 
 139. See Catherine L. Fisk & Michael Wishnie, The Story of Hoffman Plastic Com-
pounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Labor Rights without Remedies for Undocumented Immigrants, in 
LABOR LAW STORIES 399, 423-24 (Laura J. Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk eds., 2005) (telling 
the story of the Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002)); Robert B. Moberly, The Story of Electromation: Are Employee 
Participation Programs a Competitive Necessity of a Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing, in LABOR 
LAW STORIES 315, 334-35 (Laura J. Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk eds., 2005) (discussing 
amicus participation by labor law professor Charles Morris in a case involving the “com-
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Court case Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB provides an 
excellent example of the need for amicus participation.140 In Hoffman, 
the evidence showed that a plastics company fired an undocumented 
worker in retaliation for his union organizing activities.141 As a result 
of the firing, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) brought an 
unfair labor practice charge against the employer and sought full 
back pay for the worker.142 Back pay is the amount that would have 
been earned from the time of the unlawful firing to the present. In 
Hoffman, the question before the Supreme Court centered on 
whether an undocumented worker was entitled to the same remedies 
as citizen workers.143 
 The NLRB argued that back pay should be awarded because such 
a remedy would serve as a deterrent for similarly situated employ-
ers.144 Many groups weighed in on all sides of the issue, including 
immigrant rights groups and employer groups.145 The amicus briefs 
argued about the effects of limiting the available remedies for un-
documented immigrants who were fired in violation of labor law.146 
The Supreme Court held that back pay could not be awarded to the 
undocumented worker because such a remedy would “trench upon 
                                                                                                                     
pany union” provision of the NLRA); Marley S. Weiss, Kentucky River at the Intersection of 
Professional and Supervisory Status – Fertile Delta or Bermuda Triangle? in LABOR LAW 
STORIES 353, 381-82 (discussing amicus participation in support of the NLRB’s decision 
finding charge nurses at a health care facility to be employees). 
 140. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).  
 141. Id. at 140. 
 142. Id. at 140-41. 
 143. Id. at 140-42. 
 144. See Recording and Transcript of Oral Argument, Hoffman, 535 U.S. 137, available 
at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2001/2001_00_1595/argument/ (Paul Wolfson, ar-
guing on behalf of the NLRB, stated: “Congress without question recognized when it 
enacted IRCA that this was a many-faceted problem, and one aspect of the problem was 
that there was a natural magnet in drawing illegal, undocumented workers here in the 
wage differential, and that employers were willing to give jobs, and that it should not be 
cheaper for an employer to hire an undocumented alien than it is to hire [an authorized 
worker].”). The Supreme Court rejected the deterrence argument: “We have deemed such 
‘traditional remedies’ sufficient to effectuate national labor policy regardless of whether 
the ‘spur and catalyst’ of backpay accompanies them.” Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 152 (citing 
Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 904 (1984)); see also Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. 883, 904 n. 
13, (“This threat of contempt sanctions thereby provides a significant deterrent against fu-
ture violations of the [NLRA].”); Hoffman Plastics Compounds, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 237 F.3d 
639, 642 (arguing that not allowing backpay would encourage violations of the labor code).  
 145. See, e.g., Brief for Am. Civil Liberties Union Found. & Make the Road By Walk-
ing, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Hoffman, 535 U.S. 137 (No. 00-1595), 
2001 WL 1631648; Brief for Am. Fed’n of Labor and Cong. of Indus. Orgs. as Amicus Cu-
riae Supporting Respondent, Hoffman, 535 U.S. 137 (No. 00-1595), 2001 WL 1631720; 
Brief for Employers and Employer Orgs. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Hoff-
man, 535 U.S. 137 (No. 00-1595), 2001 WL 1631729; Brief for States of New York et al., as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Hoffman, 535 U.S. 137 (No. 00-1595), 2001 WL 
1636790.  
 146. See sources cited supra note 145. 
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explicit statutory prohibitions critical to federal immigration pol-
icy.”147 
 Although the Supreme Court did not decide in favor of the social 
movement groups that weighed in on behalf of the worker in Hoff-
man, the presence of the voices of social movement organizations 
were important parts of the dialogue in a case that was more about 
broad questions of immigration control than it was about back pay.148 
Moreover, since the statute being interpreted by the Court was more 
than seventy years old, the need for a continuing dialogue was even 
more important. Given the fact that interest group activity in litiga-
tion is inevitable and frequently desirable, there is reason to think 
that it is both unreasonable and undesirable to demand that judicial 
decisions be unaffected by the views of interested groups.  
 The “notice and comment” view echoes the tradition of legal real-
ism, which suggests that legal decisions are affected by the times in 
which they are rendered. Legal realists believed that there was little 
difference between the advocacy needed to change the law in the leg-
islature and in the courts.149 In the tradition of early legal realist 
Louis Brandeis, they often filed “Brandeis briefs” with the courts 
that were filled with policy arguments and social science evidence to 
sway the views of the judges.150 Amicus briefs can serve an important 
function in bringing social science evidence to the attention of the 
courts. There might be concerns about the improper use of social sci-
ence evidence, as discussed in Part V, but these concerns should be 
dealt with through the new standard advocated later in this Article. 
B.   Social Movement Dialogues 
 Social movement groups have utilized amicus briefs for many 
years. Amicus briefs have played an important role in communicat-
                                                                                                                     
 147. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 138.  
 148. Ruben J. Garcia, Ghost Workers in an Interconnected World: Going Beyond the Di-
chotomies of Domestic Immigration and Labor Laws, 36 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 737, 737-41 
(2003); Ruben J. Garcia, Labor’s Fragile Freedom of Association Post-9/11, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. 
& EMP. L. 283, 333 (2006).  
 149. JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL 
SCIENCE 1-2 (1995).  
 150. The most famous example of this was Brandeis’s brief in Muller v. Oregon, 208 
U.S. 412, (1908). See DIANA KLEBANOW & FRANKLIN L. JONAS, PEOPLE’S LAWYERS: 
CRUSADERS FOR JUSTICE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 70-71 (2003) (describing Brandeis’s repre-
sentation of the state of Oregon in defending different limits on the working hours of men 
and women). In Muller, Brandeis attempted in his brief to show the “real or substantial re-
lation to public health [and] welfare.” The brief contained only a few pages of legal argu-
ment but more than a hundred pages of data drawn from experts testifying to the connec-
tion between safety and morals and the limitation of women’s hours. For a critique of Mul-
ler from a feminist perspective, see, for example, Mary E. Becker, From Muller v. Oregon to 
Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1219 (1986).  
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ing the views of social movements to the courts in numerous cases.151 
The NAACP began its campaign against legal segregation by filing 
amicus briefs in a 1950s case involving the Westminster School Dis-
trict in Orange County, California.152 Plaintiffs in Westminster School 
District of Orange County v. Mendez successfully challenged the seg-
regation of Mexican-American children.153 Thurgood Marshall and 
Robert L. Carter, among other NAACP and ACLU lawyers, filed an 
amicus brief on behalf of the children, arguing that the school dis-
trict’s policies violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.154 The brief outlined some of the initial data that would 
be used in Brown v. Board of Education.155  
 Social movement organizations use amicus briefs to communicate 
to their constituencies and the general public. The Society of Ameri-
can Law Teachers, for example, has filed amicus briefs in several 
high profile cases.156 Sometimes, as in the case of the NAACP, or-
ganizations have used amicus briefs to test the water for broader vic-
tories, such as the Brown decision. Indeed, utilizing amicus briefs to 
                                                                                                                     
 151. See, e.g., SUZANNE U. SAMUELS, FIRST AMONG FRIENDS: INTEREST GROUPS, THE 
U.S. SUPREME COURT, AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY (2004) (examining the influence of inter-
est groups as amici); Caroline Bettinger-Lopez & Susan P. Sturm, International Union, 
U.A.W. v. Johnson Controls: The History of Litigation Alliances and Mobilizations to Chal-
lenge Fetal Protection Policies, in CIVIL RIGHTS STORIES 12-14 (Myriam Gilles & Risa 
Goluboff eds., 2007) (discussing how the litigation-centered movement against fetal protec-
tion policies was both effective and incomplete); Suzanne Uttaro Samuels, Amici Curiae 
and the Supreme Court’s Review of Fetal Protection Policies, 78 JUDICATURE 236 (1995) 
(arguing that the diverse amicus participation surrounding U.A.W. v. Johnson Controls 
contributed to the Court’s decision); Madeleine Schachter, The Utility of Pro Bono Repre-
sentation of U.S.-Based Amicus Curiae in Non-U.S. and Multi-National Courts as a Means 
of Advancing the Public Interest, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 88, 110 (2004) (discussing the im-
portance of amicus briefs in bringing media attention to the case). 
 152. Westminster Sch. Dist. of Orange County v. Mendez, 161 F.2d 774, 775 (9th
Cir. 1947). 
There is argument in two of the amicus curiae briefs that we should 
strike out independently on the whole question of segregation, on the 
ground that recent world stirring events have set men to the reexami-
nation of concepts considered fixed . . . For reasons presently to be 
stated, we are of the opinion that the segregation cases do not rule the 
instant case and that is reason enough for not responding to the argu-
ment that we should consider them in light of the amicus curiae briefs. 
Id. at 780. 
 153. Id. at 781. 
 154. Motion and Brief for the Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Colored People as 
Amicus Curiae at 16, Westminster Sch. Dist. of Orange County, 161 F.2d 774, (No. 11310) 
(on file at the Los Angeles County Law Library); see also Gilbert Gonzalez, Richard Klu-
ger’s Simple Justice: Race, Class, and United States Imperialism, 44 HIST. OF EDUC. Q. 140, 
142 (2004). 
 155. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).  
 156. See Society of American Law Teachers: Amicus Briefs, 
http://www.saltlaw.org/library (last visited Feb. 15, 2008).  
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test theories may be less ethically freighted than filing lawsuits to 
check the receptiveness of the courts to various theories. 157  
C.   Amicus Participation as a Professional Duty 
 Amicus advocacy is an important aspect of the role that lawyers 
play in a democratic society.158 This is another reason why amicus 
participation should not be unreasonably blocked by the courts. A 
lawsuit may not always be the most effective way to represent a par-
ticular client. In some cases, attorneys may fulfill their duty of dili-
gence and competence by filing an amicus brief. Often, a client may 
have an interest in litigation that is not being adequately repre-
sented by the parties in a lawsuit, but they may not have the ability 
to join the lawsuit.  
 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow persons or groups to 
join ongoing litigation as interveners. FRCP 24 requires the court to 
grant intervention in certain limited circumstances, such as when a 
statute grants a right to intervene, or when property or a transaction 
is at issue and the existing parties to a lawsuit cannot adequately 
protect the interest.159 Rule 24(b) allows the court to grant interven-
tion (1) if a statute grants a conditional right to intervene; or (2) 
when the person seeking to intervene can point to common questions 
of law and fact in the ongoing litigation.160 Although intervention 
may be available for many amicus filers, there are a number of rea-
sons why amicus filers would rather not invest the time and expense 
in being a party and would rather have their voice heard through 
amicus filing. Often, the court will allow a party who is unable to in-
tervene to participate in a case as an “amicus ‘plus,’ ” with a greater 
role than simply filing a single brief.161 Thus, the amicus brief may 
provide a valuable way for clients to make their arguments known to 
the court in a cost effective way. For that reason, amicus participa-
                                                                                                                     
 157. See Susan D. Carle, Race, Class, and Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP (1910-
1920), in LAWYERS’ ETHICS AND THE PURSUIT OF SOCIAL JUSTICE: A CRITICAL READER 114 
(Susan D. Carle ed., 2005) (discussing the test case strategy of the NAACP within the con-
text of legal ethics concepts). 
 158. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT preamble ¶6 (2003).  
 159. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a)(1), (2). Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to 
intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional 
right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or 
transaction which is the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the dis-
position of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede the applicant’s ability to 
protect that interest, unless the applicant’s interest is adequately represented by existing 
parties. Id. 
 160. FED. R. CIV. P. 24(b). The Rule allows the court to refuse intervention if the inter-
vention would “unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original par-
ties.” Id. 
 161. Liberty Res. Inc. v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 395 F. Supp. 2d 206, 209-10 (E.D. Pa. 
2005) (denying intervention but allowing “amicus plus” status, including the right to ar-
gue—with leave of the court—at court hearings). 
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tion may play an important role in lawyers’ fulfillment of their ethi-
cal duties.  
 One of the criticisms of amicus briefs is that parties might mis-
represent facts and evidence to support their position. This would be 
a violation of the ethical rules, but it is no more a danger with 
amicus briefs than any other briefs. Even though judges retain the 
authority to sanction attorneys for unlawful filings, it appears that 
judges rarely sanction attorneys for violations in amicus briefs.162 In 
any case, sanctions are always available for egregious conduct by at-
torneys who file amicus briefs. 
 Lawyers have duties of competence and diligence in representing 
their clients.163 The lawyer can fulfill these duties in a variety of 
ways, including filing amicus briefs. When a client’s interests might 
be affected by litigation to which he is not a party, a lawyer may be 
representing their clients most diligently and competently by filing 
amicus briefs in relevant litigation. Thus, the rules should not un-
reasonably limit the lawyers’ fulfillment of their ethical duties. 
 For lawyers to fulfill their roles as public citizens, sanctions 
should not be imposed lightly. Judges should reserve sanctions for 
only the most egregious actions. In this way, lawyers are better able 
to fulfill their role in a democratic society that the American Bar As-
sociation calls for in its rules.164 Lawyers would also be more willing 
to file amicus briefs when necessary on behalf of their clients if they 
did not fear discipline for their briefs. 
D.   Citizen Amicus Participation 
 Citizens may also use amicus briefs to let their voices be heard in 
the courts, even if they are not represented by attorneys. Court rules 
may also allow pro se litigants acting without attorneys to file 
amicus briefs. In the recent California Supreme Court cases on the 
San Francisco Mayor’s authority to process gay marriages, briefs 
were filed pro se by individual citizens attempting to influence the 
court’s decision. One of the amicus briefs opposing the Mayor’s ac-
tions was filed by Divine Queen Mariette Do-Nguyen.165 The sixteen-
page document, a collection of biblical verses and moralist philoso-
                                                                                                                     
 162. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 163. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1-1.3. 
 164. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT preamble ¶6 (“[A] lawyer should further the 
public’s understanding of and confidence in the rule of law and the justice system because 
legal institutions in a constitutional democracy depend on popular participation and sup-
port to maintain their authority.”). 
 165. Brief for Divine Queen Mariette Do-Nguyen, as Amici Curiae Supporting Peti-
tioner, Lockyer v. City & County of S.F., 95 P.3d 459 (2004) (Nos. S122923, S122865), 
available at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/presscenter/briefs/DIVINAC.PDF. 
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phy, was not cited at all in the court’s final decision.166 Even though 
judges may not utilize pro se briefs in their decisions or delibera-
tions, those who file these briefs at least have a voice in the judicial 
process.  
 The possibility of pro se litigants flooding the courts with frivolous 
amicus briefs is a threat to the workability of my proposed standard, 
but it should be remembered that Rule 11 sanctions would apply 
equally to attorneys as to parties without attorneys. Indeed, it is not 
clear that the current rule has kept many amicus briefs from being 
filed. The risk of vexatious filings is balanced by the benefits of de-
mocratic participation in the court system.  
 Moreover, the right to appear without a lawyer is protected both 
by the Constitution and by statutes.167 The right to appear without a 
lawyer dates to the Judiciary Act of 1789,168 where Congress provided 
that in all federal courts, “the parties may plead and conduct their 
own cases personally or by counsel.”169 In a May 2007 United States 
Supreme Court decision involving the right of parents to represent 
themselves in proceedings about the appropriateness of their dis-
abled children’s education, the definition of a “party aggrieved” was 
central to the court’s interpretation that a federal statute conferred 
that right.170 Justice Scalia, in a partial dissent, would have held that 
the statute only gives “parties” the right to challenge the appropri-
ateness of the individual education plans, but defines a “party ag-
grieved” from Black’s Law Dictionary as a person whose “personal, 
pecuniary, or property rights have been adversely affected by an-
other person’s actions or by a court’s decree or judgment.”171 This 
narrow conception of party status may limit the ability of pro se liti-
gants to file amicus briefs since their person or property may not be 
directly affected by the court’s outcome. While this limitation on 
nonparties may make sense from the perspective of Article III stand-
ing, since Article III standing requires an injury redressable by the 
court, it makes less sense for pro se amicus filing, or amicus filings 
generally, as I have argued above. Indeed, courts should view the re-
                                                                                                                     
 166. Lockyer, 95 P.3d at 495-97 (discussing arguments set forth by city and amici cu-
riae).  
 167. This is true except in the limited areas of corporations appearing without a law-
yer. Advanced Sys. Tech. Inc. v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 355, 358 (Ct. Cl. 2006) (corpora-
tion cannot appear as amici without a lawyer). In BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 
516, 519-20 (2002), Justice O’Connor wrote that the NLRB was really trying to deal with 
sham litigation. The right to Petition, she said, is one of the “the most precious of liberties 
safeguarded by the Bill of Rights” and the right of access to the courts is one aspect of the 
right to petition. Id. at 524.  
 168. 1 Stat. 73 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C). 
 169. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2000). 
 170. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 127 S. Ct. 1994, 2003 (2007). 
 171. Id. at 2007 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1154 (8th ed. 
2004)). 
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quirement of an “interest in the outcome” in the litigation broadly, in 
keeping with the normative commitments furthered in this Article. 
E.   Amici and Popular Constitutionalism 
 Increased use of amicus briefs might lend support to constitu-
tional scholars who argue that the constitutional law should better 
reflect the will of the people. Dean Larry Kramer has been one of the 
main proponents of this view.172 The popular constitutionalist view 
also has been espoused by other scholars such as Mark Tushnet and 
Sanford Levinson.173 While popular constitutionalism focuses specifi-
cally on the proper way of interpreting the Constitution, the theory 
also envisions a broader involvement in the courts than is currently 
practiced.174 The idea is that the “people themselves” create constitu-
tional law, not the courts. While not going as far as popular constitu-
tionalism, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer’s concept of 
“active liberty” also envisions an active role for citizens in their gov-
ernment, which includes the courts and constitutional interpreta-
tion.175 
 Popular constitutionalist theory focuses largely on the proper in-
stitutional arrangements for constitutional decisionmaking, but the 
theory can also be applied to statutory interpretation cases as well. If 
the interpretation of the constitution should ultimately rest with the 
people, it is not a great leap that the people should also engage in 
statutory creation, or, in Ethan Leib’s words, a “popular branch” of 
government.176 
 The difficulty of measuring public opinion and its relevance to de-
ciding constitutional law cases are only two of the problems inherent 
in popular constitutionalist theories. The merits of popular constitu-
tionalism will continue to be debated.177 That debate is not the point 
of this Article, however. All of this merely shows that active partici-
pation in government, including the courts, is increasingly viewed as 
essential to the functioning of a democratic system. That participa-
                                                                                                                     
 172. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE 
THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006). 
 173. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 194 (1999) 
(describing popular constitutionalism as a process of deciding what the Constitution 
means). 
 174. Philip Pettit, Depoliticizing Democracy, 17 RATIO JURIS 52 (2004).  
 175. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION (2005). 
 176. ETHAN J. LEIB, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A PROPOSAL FOR A 
POPULAR BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 121-23 (2004) (arguing for interest group pluralism). 
 177. See Matthew D. Adler, Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition: 
Whose Practices Ground U.S. Law?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 719, 719-21 (2006); Larry D. 
Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4, 16-
34 (2001). 
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tion can take a variety of forms, including filing amicus briefs. Thus, 
the standards for filing such amicus briefs should not be unreasona-
bly high. 
F.   Amicus Participation as Democratic Deliberation 
 Perhaps the best argument for liberal standards for the filing of 
amicus briefs is the argument for making the courts a forum for dis-
cussion in a democratic system. As discussed above, amicus partici-
pation has provided needed cues and support to social movements 
and has given social movements a stake in the rule of law.178 Delib-
erative democracy presents a view of democracy that, in its purest 
form, requires democratic decisions to be made by consensus. The 
version of deliberative democracy that I am using here is simply the 
idea that democratic decisionmaking is improved by a greater num-
ber of voices in the process.179 
 Ethan Lieb has applied deliberative democracy concepts to the 
initiative process.180 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson have writ-
ten at length on this subject.181 Judge Richard Posner has also ana-
lyzed and contrasted his approach—Schumpeterian—with delibera-
tive democracy.182 Schumpeterian democracy views the democratic 
process as largely a competition between elites for power.183 The 
Schumpeterian view may be an accurate description of the reality of 
the American political system, but this may not be the ideal. In my 
view, a system with fewer barriers to entry is more democratic than 
one controlled by elites. 
 One might ask whether the courts are the best place for democ-
ratic deliberation. Those who are skeptical of deliberative democracy 
may be especially concerned about seeing the courts as the forum for 
deliberation. The legislature or public meetings, the skeptics might 
argue, are the proper venues for such deliberation. The function of 
                                                                                                                     
 178. See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 134 
(2004) (describing deliberative democracy as a process of “seeking, not just any reasons, 
but mutually justifiable reasons, and reaching a mutually binding decision . . . [for] those 
reasons.”); see also Ruben J. Garcia, Trasnationalism as a Social Movement Strategy: Insti-
tutions, Actors, and International Labor Standards, 10 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 3 
(2003). See generally Jane Mansbridge, Conflict and Self-Interest in Deliberation, in 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND ITS DISCONTENTS 107, 107-32 (Samantha Besson & José 
Luis Martí eds., 2006); Anna-Maria Marshall, Social Movement Strategies and the Partici-
patory Potential of Litigation, in CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 164, 164-81 
(Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 2006). 
 179. Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Mapping Out the Strategic Terrain: The Informa-
tional Role of Amici Curiae, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST 
APPROACHES 215 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999).  
 180. LEIB, supra note 176, at 12-29. 
 181. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 178. 
 182. POSNER, supra note 23, at 16, 204-05. 
 183. Id. at 14. 
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the courts in this view is to make decisions about the law with a 
minimal amount of interference. While this might be an ideal vision 
of courts, a legal realist appraisal of the courts accepts that judges 
will be influenced by a number of different factors in their decision-
making. The virtue of greater amicus participation is that these in-
fluences are visible to those who wish to know them. 
 As described in his book, Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy, 
Judge Richard Posner criticizes deliberative democracy as a mode of 
legislation and adjudication.184 Posner believes that “neither delib-
erative democracy on the left nor public choice theory on the right 
represents a pragmatic theory of lawmaking.”185 Instead, Posner fa-
vors economist Joseph Schumpeter’s vision of democracy, where el-
ites compete for votes and represent the interests of people who have 
neither the time nor the ability to focus on matters of democratic 
governance.186 Posner believes that Schumpeterian democracy is both 
normatively superior to other theories of democracy and the most ac-
curate description of American democracy today.187 Posner’s pragma-
tist views of lawmaking and adjudication eschews grand theory for 
practical consequentialist theories.188 
 Posner’s views of democracy align with his views toward amicus 
participation. Posner’s questioning of the value of more amicus par-
ties to judicial decisionmaking is consistent with his critique of delib-
erative democracy and public choice theories. As I have argued 
above, both deliberative democracy and interest group theories add 
something of value to judicial decisionmaking. Moreover, it is hard to 
characterize American democracy as any one kind of democracy; it is 
a blend of elite competition, public choice, and deliberative democ-
racy. Finally, it is difficult to see the application of Schumpeterian 
theory to federal adjudication without elevating unelected judges to a 
kind of super elite status that not even legislators have. Thus, espe-
cially in the federal context, amicus participation can provide an im-
portant channel of communication with the judiciary. 
 In summary, amicus participation can be viewed from a number of 
different democratic perspectives, including participatory democracy, 
popular constitutionalism, and deliberative democracy. As described 
above, amicus participation can also be part of interest group politics. 
The point of this Article, however, is to show that amicus participa-
tion can be a part of other visions of democracy as well.  
                                                                                                                     
 184. Id. at 161. 
 185. Id. at 198. 
 186. Id. at 16-17.  
 187. Id. at 192-93 (describing Schumpeterian democracy as “competitive democracy”).  
 188. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL 
THEORY (1999) (highlighting Posner’s pragmatist viewpoint).  
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V.   LET’S BE FRIENDS: BALANCING SCARCE JUDICIAL RESOURCES AND 
ROBUST AMICUS PARTICIPATION 
 Having established above that amicus participation plays an im-
portant role in a democratic system, the question remains whether 
the current rules concerning amicus briefs do enough to foster 
amicus participation. There is no debate that caseloads in the federal 
court system will continue to increase.189 As a result, many judges 
might wish for a more stringent standard than the one that is cur-
rently in place to limit the number of filings that they must sort 
through. As discussed above, judges may impose additional require-
ments that are not specifically in the amicus rule in order to limit the 
number of amicus briefs filed.190 On the other hand, the text of the 
rule places a minimal standard on the filing of amicus briefs that 
does not give much guidance to the court or the parties in terms of 
what is acceptable. 
 While Judge Posner’s concerns about the negative effects of 
amicus briefs may be present in some cases, most of those who file 
amicus briefs merely want to have their voices heard. However, there 
is still a need for a more flexible standard for dealing with amicus 
briefs than the current one. In this Part, I propose a new but familiar 
standard that I think will better balance the interests at stake. 
 The controversial cases discussed above seem to lend support to 
Judge Posner’s concerns about amicus briefs being used as interest 
group activity. Despite these recent examples, however, most courts 
will likely continue to accept amicus briefs for filing without much 
hesitation. Nevertheless, the continuing importance of amicus briefs 
in the Supreme Court will heighten the tension between a relatively 
open attitude toward amicus briefs and the more restrictive view es-
poused by Judge Posner. Because amicus filings are within the dis-
cretion of the trial court, the most likely sanction for an untoward 
amicus brief is simply that it will not be accepted for filing. This, 
coupled with the lack of sanctions imposed against attorneys for fil-
ing amicus briefs, suggests the need to look at the standard to make 
it both easier to file meritorious amicus briefs and to punish the fil-
ing of frivolous amicus briefs. 
                                                                                                                     
 189. See generally MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST 
SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987) (examining the significance of the NAACP’s 
litigation campaign against segregated schools and its impact upon the theory and practice 
of public interest law). 
 190. Compare Roy T. Englert, Jr., In Favor of Friends: Courts Find Gold in Those 
Amicus Briefs, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 25, 2003, at 50, with Leslie T. Thornton, With Friends 
Like These . . . the Weight of 90-plus Amicus Briefs in the Michigan Cases Ought to Influ-
ence the Court, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 31, 2003, at 70. 
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A.   A Familiar Standard 
 The standards in FRCP 11 should be used to provide a better 
threshold for the acceptance or rejection of amicus briefs.191 FRCP 11 
allows federal judges to sanction parties for briefs that are without 
factual or legal support, brought in bad faith, or meant to harass. 
The text of FRCP 11 could be applied to require amicus filers to cer-
tify that:  
(1) [their brief] is not being presented for any improper purpose, 
such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase 
the cost of litigation; 
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted 
by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, 
modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law; 
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if 
specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after 
a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and 
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence 
or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a 
lack of information.192 
 The four elements of FRCP 11 above would place a substantive 
limitation on amicus briefs that is more understandable than the 
current rule. The first clause takes care of amicus filers who have 
improper purposes, and emphasizes that an amicus brief cannot har-
ass or cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of 
litigation.193 This goes to the substantive motivations of the persons 
filing the briefs. The second clause of the rule deals with the threat of 
meritless filings. The factual allegations that are made by amicus fil-
ers should be testable by the court or the parties.194 
 Under this new standard, the Graham-Kyl brief discussed earlier 
might have been rejected for putting forth false evidence about the 
legislative debate surrounding the Guantanamo detainees.195 The re-
quirement in FRCP 11(a)(4) that litigants certify that denials of fac-
tual contentions are warranted will not often be relevant to amicus 
                                                                                                                     
 191. One commentator has recognized the need for reform of amicus rules to balance 
ethical advocacy with vigorous amicus participation. See Nancy Bage Sorensen, The Ethi-
cal Implications of Amicus Briefs: A Proposal for Reforming Rule 11 of the Texas Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, 30 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1219, 1262-63 (1999). Sorensen’s focus was on the 
ethical duty to disclose the financial supporters of amicus briefs toward greater transpar-
ency in Texas appellate practice. Id. While the proposal articulated here is broader than 
Sorensen’s, her proposal is also in keeping with the greater democratic transparency sup-
ported above. 
 192. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1)-(4). 
 193. Id. 11(b)(1). 
 194. Id. 11(b)(2). 
 195. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.  
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filers, since such filers do not generally deny factual contentions 
made by the parties. Nevertheless, the court would have the inherent 
discretion to decide whether or not cause exists to sanction amicus 
filers.  
 The standards of FRCP 11 provide a sensible threshold for the fil-
ing of amicus briefs, although there has been some concern about the 
negative consequences of FRCP 11 for parties to litigation. FRCP 11 
has been criticized for creating a litigation process that is sometimes 
used by parties as a cudgel against their counterparts.196 This con-
cern is not pertinent to the standard that I propose here. Under this 
standard, if an amicus brief lacks factual or legal support, the brief 
will not be received by the court. The court could use its inherent dis-
cretion to decide whether to sanction parties in addition to refusing 
their filings, but my use of the FRCP 11 standard does not presup-
pose that all parties whose briefs are rejected would also be sanc-
tioned. In practice, most parties whose amicus briefs are rejected 
would probably not be sanctioned, except for those that are truly 
egregious or vexatious.197 
 Some might be concerned that a Rule 11 type standard will en-
courage gamesmanship and the satellite litigation that FRCP 11 has 
spawned.198 In other words, parties and other amicus filers might ex-
haust all their energies trying to prevent other parties from filing 
amicus briefs. The response to this concern is that the current sys-
tem also encourages a certain amount of gamesmanship on the ques-
tion of whether the proposed amicus brief adds anything new to the 
case.199 Also, Rule 11 may encourage such gamesmanship because of 
the potential for attorneys’ fees awards for successful moving par-
ties—something that the proposal that I envision would not auto-
matically contain, but which is certainly possible at the judge’s dis-
cretion.200  
 While application of my proposed standard may force inquiry into 
the motive of those filing amicus briefs, that inquiry is possible even 
                                                                                                                     
 196. See generally Danielle Kie Hart, And the Chill Goes On—Federal Civil Rights 
Plaintiffs Beware: Rule 11 vis-à-vis 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the Court’s Inherent Power, 37 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 645 (2004). 
 197. Many states could also use the standard advocated here. For a good study of state 
amicus rules, see Sarah F. Corbally & Donald C. Bross, A Practical Guide for Filing 
Amicus Curiae Briefs in State Appellate Courts 6 tbl. 1 (2001), available at 
http://www.naccchildlaw.org/documents/amicuspracticalguide.pdf. 
 198. See, e.g., George Cochran, The Reality of “A Last Victim” and Abuse of the Sanc-
tioning Power, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 691, 693 (2004) (discussing how the possibility of fee 
shifting under Rule 11 creates incentives for satellite litigation).  
 199. See, e.g., Hammond v. Junction City, No. 00-2146-JWL, 2001 WL 1665374, at *1-2 
(D. Kan. Dec. 17, 2001) (granting the National Employment Lawyers Association’s request 
to participate as amicus curiae over the objections of the defendants that the brief “adds 
nothing” and is “duplicative” of the plaintiff’s efforts).  
 200. See Hart, supra note 196, at 658.  
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under the current standards. Indeed, the point of this standard is to 
discourage judges from too eagerly searching for bad motives on the 
part of litigants. The standard is meant to look something like the 
“vexatious litigant” standard familiar to many judges. If amicus 
briefs are not vexatious or plainly meritless, then they should proba-
bly be accepted for filing. While this might result in more amicus 
briefs being filed, it is unlikely to significantly change the workload 
of federal judges because, under the current rules, judges are still re-
quired to determine whether an amicus brief adds anything to the 
arguments of the parties. Under the standard I propose here, there 
may be more briefs filed but judges would spend less time going 
through them to determine whether they “add anything new” to the 
arguments already made by the parties; judges would simply be on 
alert for any activity that suggests bad faith, which would not likely 
be onerous. 
 The use of a FRCP 11-type standard for amicus briefs will clarify 
what is expected of amicus filers. Other common parts of the rules on 
amicus participation may serve important purposes and should be 
retained. The rule that requires disclosure of any contributions or 
payment of fees from the parties to the amici is important to prevent 
parties with a greater number of resources from overpowering the 
other parties in the litigation. There should not necessarily be a right 
for wealthy parties to increase their already loud voices in the litiga-
tion if they are able to pay allies to appear as amici. Thus, the rules 
on disclosure need not be eliminated.201   
 Without having to show that a brief adds anything new, there 
might be more amicus briefs filed. The magnitude of the increase is 
uncertain, but an empirical question remains as to whether amicus 
filings would increase markedly as a result of a change in the stan-
dard. It is far from clear that the current rules are preventing many 
amicus briefs from being filed, but there is a chance that amicus fil-
ings might increase.  
 This is not to say that courts cannot seek more information about 
those who file amicus briefs. The identity of those who fund amicus 
briefs in some cases might be necessary for judges to know whether 
they need to recuse themselves, and many courts have this sort of 
rule for parties.202 The U.S. Supreme Court and some federal appel-
late courts require disclosure of whether the amici are receiving 
                                                                                                                     
 201. See Sorensen, supra note 191, at 1257-58. 
 202. See, e.g., 2D CIR. R. 29, available at http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/Docs/Rules/ 
LR29.pdf (“The Court ordinarily will deny leave to file a brief for an amicus curiae where, 
by reason of a relationship between a judge who would hear the proceeding and the amicus 
or counsel for the amicus, the filing of the brief would cause the recusal of the judge.”).  
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compensation from any party to the lawsuit for filing the brief.203 
This rule allows the courts to know the full extent of “interest group 
activity” and to know whether the judges have a financial interest in 
the litigation or a connection to one of the parties. There may be 
other ways in which judges can know exactly who is funding litiga-
tion, such as at the filing of the complaint, but all of this transpar-
ency would serve to blunt much of the criticism of amicus briefs as 
interest group activity. In many ways, amicus briefs are more trans-
parent than traditional forms of lobbying. 
B.   Concerns About Scientific Evidence 
 There might be a concern that amicus filers will try to introduce 
evidence, sometimes social science evidence, which has not been vet-
ted through the trial court. Indeed, some of the most notable uses of 
amicus briefs have brought social science evidence to the attention of 
the court. The question of whether judges will be beguiled by false 
social science evidence is a concern, but judges give little weight to 
social science evidence not presented to the trial court. Some attor-
neys may use amicus briefs as an end-run around the stricter evi-
dence rules mandated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.204 In Daubert, the United States 
Supreme Court set the parameters for the admission of scientific evi-
dence in the trial courts. Basically, the trial court must first deter-
mine whether the expert’s opinion constitutes scientific knowledge, 
and then determine whether the opinion logically advances a mate-
rial aspect of the offering party’s case.205 The question of whether im-
properly vetted evidence will be relied upon by appellate courts is a 
persistent one and is a larger question than just having to do with 
amicus briefs.  
 There is certainly the possibility for the use of scientific evidence 
in amicus briefs. A recent example of this was the Supreme Court de-
cision in Gonzales v. Carhart.206 This case tested the constitutionality 
of the Congressional ban on partial birth abortion, which the Court 
upheld by a 5-4 vote.207 The Court deferred to congressional findings 
about the intact dilation procedure, in order to hold that the proce-
dure was never medically necessary.208 In his opinion for the Court, 
Justice Anthony Kennedy pointed to another reason for the ruling, 
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which he could apply to all abortions: “While we find no reliable data 
to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude 
some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they 
once created and sustained.”209 For this proposition, Justice Kennedy 
cites the amicus brief of Sandra Cano and others filed by the Justice 
Foundation, a conservative group.210  
 The evidence provided for “abortion trauma syndrome” in Cano’s 
amicus brief is at best anecdotal, and the American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation recognizes no such disorder.211 It is also notable that evidence 
of this condition was not submitted in the lower courts.212 The Court 
nonetheless seemed to endorse as an alternative reason a scientific 
conclusion for which there is considerable doubt. The submission of 
scientific evidence of doubtful validity could have a negative impact 
on the ability of other parties to present empirical evidence, but 
courts should instead scrutinize such submissions carefully to deter-
mine whether further information is needed.213 
 While the amicus brief in Gonzales likely did not play a disposi-
tive role in the outcome, it lent some support to the result that the 
Court reached. In fact, Justice Kennedy had dissented from the 
Court’s decision in Stenberg v. Carhart seven years earlier, where the 
Court struck down Nebraska’s partial birth abortion statute because 
it did not have an exception for the health and safety of the 
mother.214 Nevertheless, the amicus brief in Gonzales, containing 
over a hundred pages of one-paragraph affidavits from a number of 
women who in most cases were identified only by their initials, sup-
ports the central premise of this Article toward greater public par-
ticipation in the courts. 
 There have been other recent examples of amicus briefs that have 
included the voices of many people affected by the decision. In the 
University of Michigan affirmative action cases, a brief was filed by 
13,922 law students from around the country in support of the law 
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school’s affirmative action program.215 This sort of brief seems to be 
more along the lines of a petition but it did communicate to the Court 
that a large number of individuals would be affected by the decision. 
The students’ amicus brief was not cited by any of the justices in 
their opinions in the case.216 Nevertheless, the Court held that the 
University of Michigan law school’s efforts to enroll a critical mass of 
diverse students did not violate the Constitution’s Equal Protection 
Clause.217 
 In contrast, the amicus brief discussed above in Gonzales was 
seeking to use the affidavits of the women who regretted having 
abortions to argue for the existence of a medical condition that had 
little relevance to the central issue in the case—whether the intact 
dilation procedure was ever medically necessary.218 Unlike the stu-
dents’ brief in the University of Michigan cases, the Justice Founda-
tion’s brief was cited favorably by Justice Kennedy.219 Studies of the 
effect of social science evidence in the courts show that judges most 
often seek information from amici in the scientific fields.220 One study 
of a state supreme court showed that the justices took sixty percent 
of their citations to empirical research from the record, briefs, and 
amicus briefs.221  
 With respect to amicus briefs in the trial courts, there is always 
the opportunity for the judge to seek testimony from experts who 
submit amicus briefs in court, which would presumably be tested in 
accordance with the Daubert standard discussed above. In the appel-
late courts, judges can exercise considerably wider discretion to de-
cide when scientific evidence is credible or not. Thus, if some “junk 
science” comes into an appellate decision through an amicus brief, it 
is primarily the fault of the judge or the parties in failing to debunk 
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it. As a result, a fear of junk science is not a reason to limit the abil-
ity of parties to raise scientific studies in their briefs. 
C.   The Duties of Judges in Handling Amicus Briefs 
 A more liberal standard for accepting amicus briefs might place a 
greater burden on judges and encourage them to be selective in 
which briefs they read. This effect should be treated with concern, 
but this concern should not be overstated. After all, the current rules 
leave room for judges to pick and choose among different parties’ 
briefs. Under Canon 3 of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, 
“[a] judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a 
proceeding . . . the right to be heard according to law.”222 The rule 
suggests that if a judge grants leave to file an amicus brief, the brief 
should be given the same attention that any other properly filed brief 
is given.  
 Despite the best efforts of judges to fairly evaluate all amicus 
briefs, there will be limits to how much attention they can give a 
flood of amicus briefs. In denying leave to file the amicus briefs, 
Judge Posner correctly pointed out that “[i]t would [be improper] for 
[a judge] to permit the filing of an [amicus] brief and then not read it 
. . . (or [leave it to] clerks to read it).”223 In the end, however, it would 
be up to writers of the briefs to make a convincing case early on in 
the brief as to why their arguments should be given attention.  
 Although amicus filers are unlikely to file constitutional chal-
lenges if their amicus briefs are rejected, there are constitutional due 
process dimensions to the denial of leave to file an amicus brief. 
While judges may have ethical obligations to parties, judges do not 
have due process obligations to amicus filers. This is because the due 
process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments require 
procedural due process only for those whose “life, liberty, or property” 
is under threat of deprivation.224 Despite this, there are First 
Amendment dimensions to amicus participation that warrant atten-
tion. Moreover, the question of whether nonlawyers have a right to 
file amicus briefs also raises important constitutional issues.  
 The more liberal standard for allowing the filing of amicus briefs 
in this Article is not intended to place unreasonable burdens on 
judges or the courts. Nor is it intended to give clerks inordinate 
power.225 Instead, this Article seeks to extend the minimal due proc-
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ess consideration afforded party litigants to amicus filers. While 
some might argue that a more liberal standard for amicus briefs 
would place an unreasonable burden on the courts, the claim must be 
evaluated in terms of the burden that currently exists on judges to 
decide whether the amicus brief presented for filing adds anything 
new to the arguments already presented by the parties. The standard 
favored in this Article would actually lessen the burden on judges to 
make the determination of whether anything new was added by the 
amicus briefs. This standard probably represents the current reality 
because most amicus briefs are accepted for filing. Thus, the stan-
dard proposed here should not markedly increase the burden on the 
courts. 
 Of course, some judges might already use sorting techniques to al-
locate their scarce time to read briefs. A recent analysis of Justice 
Sandra Day O’Connor’s decisions, for example, shows that she cited 
most often to the briefs of prestigious professional associations, the 
Solicitor General, and the states.226 Another study suggests that the 
Justices might favor the amicus briefs of large institutional play-
ers.227 
 In the end, judges will use a variety of methods to deal with their 
increasing workloads. In a recent article, former Supreme Court 
clerks acknowledged that justices often separate amicus briefs based 
on their authors.228 Justice Ginsburg, for example, has stated that 
her chambers divides piles of briefs between “must-read,” “skim,” and 
“skip” categories.229 There is a good chance that other Supreme Court 
justices and federal judges use similar sorting techniques. There is 
also a chance that some judges will use denial of leave to file as a 
sorting technique. 
 One of the most prominent objections to a more liberal standard 
toward amicus briefs is the institutional burden more amicus briefs 
would place on the courts. Justice Ginsburg’s “pile system” suggests 
that judges will find ways to deal with any increase in briefs filed. 
Some might rightfully be concerned that this would lead judges to 
discriminate even more than they already do based on the persons or 
entities filing the briefs. There are several responses to this argu-
ment. First, it seems unlikely that even a different standard for ac-
cepting amicus briefs will markedly increase the number of amicus 
briefs filed. Second, judges are likely to use various techniques to sort 
information similar to those used to sort briefs filed by parties, such 
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as the reputation of the lawyers filing the briefs or the viewpoint of 
the party filing the briefs. This is not a reason to limit the number of 
participants to litigation, but rather to encourage judges to give a fair 
hearing to all parties. 
 Increased amicus participation will have a democratizing influ-
ence on the litigation process because, as stated above, it is often 
more cost effective for social movements to make their voices heard 
as amicus parties than as parties bringing litigation.230 The question 
of whether more amicus briefs would lead judges to give less atten-
tion to the briefs filed by parties if more amicus briefs are filed re-
mains unanswered. While there are institutional limits on the num-
ber of briefs that courts can handle, the focus should be on the mini-
mal attention that judges give litigants. This points us to the mini-
mal due process standards that should be afforded to all litigants. 
Even under the current amicus rules, there will be a limit to the pa-
tience of judges regarding a large number of amicus briefs.  
 If the standard proposed in this Article is adopted, there might be 
an increase in the number of amicus briefs that are filed. If that oc-
curs, the need for self-regulation of the profession will be more im-
portant.231 As a strategic matter, it is in the interest of amicus filers 
to form coalitions to maximize their impact before the court. Thus, 
any increase in amicus filings will probably be offset by the increased 
coalition building among large and small groups such as We Make 
the Road by Walking, Inc., a social service group for immigrants on 
which filed an amicus brief in Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. 
NLRB, discussed above.232 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 Because American courts are the locus for decisions with vast po-
litical, social, and economic implications, it is understandable that 
there is increasing pressure for the public’s voice to be heard in the 
judicial process. As this occurs, there will likely be pressure to regu-
late and limit the number of amicus filings to ensure that judges are 
not unduly burdened by a large number of briefs, and to screen out 
frivolous arguments. The current system, which largely allows indi-
vidual judges to decide which briefs to accept, will need to be modi-
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fied to provide guidelines that will maximize democratic participa-
tion without being unduly burdensome for judges. In this Article, I 
argue for a new standard based on the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure that would be more in keeping with both pluralist and delibera-
tive conceptions of democracy.  
 The standard that I propose here balances concerns about an in-
crease in amicus briefs with the important implications for the 
American democratic system. The new amicus rule I propose, bor-
rowed from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, still gives judges 
the opportunity to reject amicus briefs that are frivolous or filed in 
bad faith. I believe this standard will better serve the goals of 
broader participation in the legal system. More amicus participation 
may also increase the faith in the judicial system that is eroding in 
some quarters today. With a more liberal standard, litigants will con-
tinue to band together in groups and associations in order to maxi-
mize their impact on the court.   
 Amicus participation likely will continue to increase, irrespective 
of the rules applied to amicus briefs. As amicus participation in-
creases, I predict that the rules on amicus participation, which thus 
far have been minor obstacles to the filing of most amicus briefs, will 
be used as gatekeepers more frequently. Ultimately, in my view, 
judges will continue to be the gatekeepers and filters. Current 
amicus rules can be modified to limit only the most vexatious par-
ticipation. A new standard for the acceptance of amicus filings in this 
respect would be more in keeping with both pluralist and delibera-
tive conceptions of democracy. 
 The continually increasing caseloads of the federal courts will 
sharpen the tension between the need for greater access to the courts 
for nonparties and the prevention of diluted adjudication. As with 
many current controversies, these tensions should be resolved with 
some overarching democratic principles in mind. On one hand, 
amicus filers may burden the courts. Yet, amicus participation is an 
important part of the democratic process, as I have argued above. 
This is why I argue for a different standard for courts to use in decid-
ing whether to accept amicus briefs for filing. I think this standard 
will be both easier to apply and also focus in on the real concerns—
frivolous filings. Debates about deliberative democracy will continue. 
The role of litigation and the judiciary in defining the contours of our 
democracy will continue to be part of this discourse. 
